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Massacres and assassinations in Aceh 
There is no sign of an end to the killings in Aceh. On the contrary, they continue to escalate. Aceh is 
now the worst war zone in Asia. No part of the province is untouched by the tragedy and no family is 
unscathed by the toll in lives lost, dis'!Jlpearances and the associated trauma. Two massacres occurred 
in August and the number of public jtgures assassinated has lengthened with the killing of the rector 
of Aceh 's leading state university and several members of legislative assemblies. 
On 9 August 2001 , a massacre that took the lives of at least 
thirty people occurred on the premises of a palm oil plan-
tation, PT Bumi Flora, in Banda Alam, Julok sub-district, 
East Aceh. Seven men were severely injured and taken to a 
local hospital where they were placed under heavy guard by 
the Indonesian military; three were later transferred to a 
hospital in Medan. It later emerged that several men were 
not hit and were able to flee from the site; one of the 
survivors went into hiding and was subsequently inter-
viewed (see below). This is the worst massacre to have 
occurred in Aceh since July 1999 when 56 men were slain 
by troops at the Bantaqiah religious school in North Aceh. 
Military cover-up 
The massacre occurred at around 8am. At 7.30, a unit of 
about twenty soldiers pushed their way into the workers' 
barracks and without warning or provocation, ordered all 
the Acehnese men workers to come out of their homes and 
assemble in a yard. The women were ordered to remain in 
their homes while the men were ordered to strip to the waist, 
to squat in rows. They were then summarily shot dead. The 
killers had made a point of ensuring that the victims were all 
Acehnese and checked on the ethnic identity of all their 
victims. 
One of the men came out of his home carrying his two-
and-a-half-year-old son, thinking that soldiers would not 
harm someone carrying a child. The man and his child were 
both killed, while the child's mother who tried to take the boy 
from his father's arms was wounded when the soldiers 
opened fire. 
The moment news of the massacre broke, the security 
forces alleged that the Free Aceh Movement was respon-
sible, claiming that their men had tried unsuccessfully to 
collect · money from the workers. GAM denied any 
involvement and said that a few days earlier, they 
conducted an attack on an army post recently set up near 
the plantation when they succeeded in killing a number of 
Indonesian soldiers. (This has not been confirmed by the 
Indonesian military.) According to GAM, the massacre 
may have been in retaliation for this action. 
Calls for an independent investigation of the massacre 
from TAPOL and other human rights organisations have 
gone unheeded. 
Witnesses identify military as the killers 
Following the massacre, the security forces sealed off the 
area, making it very difficult for human rights monitors to go 
and investigate. About a week after the tragedy, a fact-finding 
team was set up by the district chief of East Aceh. The team 
was able to enter the area, possibly with a military escort, and 
interview witnesses but its findings have not yet been made 
public. TAPOL has seen some of the testimonies given to the 
Team which make it clear that the killers were Indonesian 
soldiers. It seems that the local officials who were part of the 
Team fear the consequences of producing a report which 
exposes the falsehoods of the Indonesian military. 
Two witnesses who went into hiding after the massacre 
were interviewed by a Japanese activist from Nindja, an 
organisation with a track record of monitoring the human 
rights situation in Aceh. The interviews were later reported 
ACEH 
Massacres and assassinations in Aceh 
No change for Aceh under Megawati 
POLITICS 
The Key Figures in Megawati 's kitchen cabinet 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
A Human Rights agenda for Megawati 
ARMS SALES 
West keen to enhance military ties 
EASTTIMOR 
Timorese go to the polls 
1965 
pl 
p4 
p7 
p lO 
p12 
pl4 
What the US and Britain knew but never revealed p 17 
BOOK REVIEW 
Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia, by 
Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk p20 
WEST PAPUA 
Special autonomy for Papua provokes controversy p21 
Brimob's 'Sweep-and-Crush' operation p23 
GLOBAL CRISIS 
Indonesia and the current world crisis p24 
l 
ACEH 
by CNN's online service. One of the witnesses was one of 
four men who survived the massacre. He said that the 
perpetrators 'were wearing military fatigues and carrying 
M-16 rifles (and) entered the plantation area from the back 
of the workers' houses'. 
The other was the wife of one of the slain men who said: 
'It was the military who did the shooting. It was not possi-
ble that GAM did it. They could not speak Acehnese. They 
asked, "Are these Acehnese or Javanese?" I said, Acehnese. 
They only nodded their heads and did not speak more".' 
[CNNcom, 2 September 2001] 
The interviews were also made available separately to 
TAPOL. According to the woman, the men were ordered to 
strip to the waist and within two minutes of leaving their 
homes, she heard a single volley of gunfire. 'I thought the 
soldiers had shot into the air, but when I went outside, all 
the men were lying prostrate on the ground. The whole thing 
took no longer than three minutes. One man was carrying a 
child but it was killed as well. His wife tried to grab the 
child but she was also hit.' 
She said that the women did not go out to attend to the 
bodies because they were afraid that the military might 
return. At two in the afternoon, an Indonesian Red Cross 
ambulance arrived and took the bodies away for burial.. 
SIRA investigations 
SIRA, the Information Centre for a Referendum in Aceh, 
produced two reports, the second of which, dated 29 
August, stressed that conditions in the area were very tense 
because of the heavy presence of security forces and heli-
copters flying overhead. One witness, a plantation worker 
from nearby Langsa, said that on his way to work, he passed 
two military trucks on their way to the plantation. Another 
witness, probably a young boy, explained that soldiers came 
looking for his father who was not at home. When they 
found him, they took him back to his home, ransacked the 
house and took what money they could find, then ordered 
him to stand outside the house where they shot him dead. 
After shooting their victims, the soldiers examine the 
bodies one by one, turning them with their boots and rifle 
tips, and shooting those who were still alive. (We now know 
that some of the men, probably covered with blood, were 
able to feign death.) 
TAPOL has seen the testimonies of several witnesses who 
say they saw soldiers scoop up blood and sip it. The SIRA 
report also identified the perpetrators as non-organic troops 
sent from outside the province. They were members of Tim 
Rajawali, a unit composed of specially-trained counter-
insurgency troops from the ranks of KOS TRAD, the army's 
strategic command, KOPASSUS, the elite commandos and 
the West Java Siliwangi division. These troops had set up a 
new military post near the plantation shortly before the 
Julok Massacre. 
Nine killed including five boys 
The Julok Massacre was followed, ten days later, by a 
second massacre in the nearby sub-district of Idi 
Tunong. Nine males were shot dead in cold 
blood, including five boys aged between 13 and 
16 years. Prior to this second massacre, Tim 
Rajawali soldiers had been conducting house 
searches and regular foot-patrols, looking for 
witnesses of the Julok Massacre. 
According to a report by the Coalition of 
Human Rights NGOs, troops entered the village 
of Baro, Idi Tunong sub-district at 9pm on 19 
August and came upon a group of boys drinking 
coffee together. The boys were ordered to produce 
their identity cards which were confiscated and to 
strip to the waist. The troops then moved on to 
another coffee shop where they rounded up a 
number of males. By this time, they had caught 
altogether twelve men. Three boys managed to 
escape and fled to the hills chased by soldiers, 
while the other nine were taken off to an unknown 
destination. 
Two days later, villagers heard that there were several 
newly-dug mounds of earth in the nearby village of Kayu 
Tiga. Later that day, Red Cross volunteers and activists from 
the NGO Coalition went to Kayu Tiga where they found 
four shallow graves. The bodies were those of the nine men 
and boys who had been taken away two days earlier. All the 
bodies were covered with injuries caused by stabbing, slic-
ing with knives, beating with blunt instruments and stran-
gulation. [This report is based on two reports of the 
massacre, one by SIRA and one by the Human Rights NGO 
Coalition.] 
Subsequent reports in the Indonesian press alleged that the 
graves had been discovered by the security forces as 
reported by the army, but local activists called this a distor-
tion of the truth. 
SIRA has also reported other incidents just before the 
Massacre of the Nine. On 18 August, soldiers shot at and 
wounded a student in the village of Simpang Toman in Idi 
Rayeuk sub-district. The troops were identified as coming 
from Company B, based in nearby Peudawa. Later that day, 
these troops, travelling in two trucks escorted by an 
armoured assault vehicle, alighted from their trucks to harass 
people on the road, in shops and fishing in the river. People 
panicked and started to flee, whereupon the troops opened 
fire, killing three men who were fishing. Another fisherman 
was caught as he tried to flee the scene. He was badly beaten 
up and left on the roadside in a critical condition. 
Intelligence operation 
How to explain this mindless spate of killings inflicted on 
groups of civilians, concentrated in one part of East Aceh? 
SIRA says there are indications that this is the work of mili-
tary intelligence based in Medan, where the North Sumatra 
regional military command, Bukit Barisan has its headquar-
ters. Compare this perhaps to the intelligence operation 
based at the Udayana military command in Bali during the 
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weeks and months before and after the ballot in East Timor 
on 30 August 1999, when militias ran riot throughout East 
Timor. The motive for such an operation is not difficult 
deduct: to accuse GAM of killing civilians and to terrorise 
villagers who have deep-felt anger towards the Indonesian 
security forces and perhaps see GAM as an acceptable alter-
native. Intelligence operations are, by definition, extremely 
difficult to pin down. Hence the need for an independent 
investigation into the events surrounding the Julok Massacre. 
On 10 September, Ann Clwyd MP, chairperson of the 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group, called on the National 
Human Rights Commission to set up a special commission 
of investigation into the Julok Massacre and related killings. 
She said the investigation team would need the participation 
of experts trained in the exhumation of bodies and said that 
the investigation team should ensure the full protection of 
witnesses and provide necessary safeguards to witnesses 
once the commission has completed its work. 
University rector assassinated 
On 6 September, the people of Aceh were once again 
shocked by the assassination of a well-known public figure, 
the rector of Syiah Kuala University, who was killed while 
being driven home from work. Professor Dayan Dawood 
was shot in the head and chest by unidentified gunmen who 
were able to escape. His driver, who was unhurt, immedi-
ately drove to a nearby hospital but Professor Dawood was 
dead on arrival. 
The assassination occurred in broad daylight on one of Banda 
Aceh's main highways which was swarming with troops in 
preparation for the visit to Aceh two days later of President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri. Two days before he was killed, 
Professor had gone on record with an offer to mediate in the 
stalled talks between GAM and the Indonesian government. 
In a statement on 7 September, calling for 'a thorough and 
impartial investigation into the killing', Human Rights 
Watch said the assassination which occurred within half a 
kilometre from the governor's office could not have 
happened 'without the complicity of military elements'. A 
local human rights NGO shows this to have been quite an 
under-statement. USADHA, the Union of Activists for 
Democracy and Human Rights in Aceh, said that the rector 
was shot just a hundred metres from a military post guard-
ing the governor's office. The killers struck as the traffic 
slowed before going up a slope onto a bridge, near a set of 
traffic lights. A jeep just in front was moving slowly, and the 
gunman, on a motorbike, took aim and was able to get away 
easily by turning left along a side street, despite the pres-
ence of large numbers of soldiers patrolling the area. 
The assassination came a year almost to the day after 
another senior academic was killed. Professor Syafwan 
Idris, rector of the Islamic University, ar-Raniry, was killed 
in his home on 16 September 2000. 
Three days before Prof Dawood's murder, the head of the 
Teachers' Association in Aceh, announced that 135 elemen-
tary, junior high and high school teachers had been victims 
of violence over the past two years. 
Legislators assassinated 
There has also been a spate of killings of Acehnese 
members of local and national legislative assemblies. Five 
days before the murder of Professor Dawood, Zaini 
Sulaiman, a member of the Aceh provincial (first-level) 
legislative assembly representing the United Development 
Party, the PPP, was shot in the head by gunmen at his home 
on 1 September following evening prayers. 
ACEH 
The other legislators killed since June last year are: 
Harun Aldi, a member of the second-level South Aceh 
legislative assembly - DPRD-11 - representing the 
Indonesian Democratic Party - Struggle (PDI-P). His badly-
injured body was found on 11 June 2000 by villagers in the 
village of Ruak, North Kluet sub-district. South Aceh. 
Tgk Ibrahim Ilyas, a respected religious teacher, was a 
member of the second-level North Aceh legislative assem-
bly - DPRD-II - representing the Development Party, PPP, 
was shot dead on 12 September 2000 at 8.30pm. A month 
before he was murdered, the victim received threats from a 
young man who said his group was not happy with the 
DRPD member's activities in regard to their group. He told 
a friend that he had also received a death threat. 
T. Djohan, a regional representative for Central Aceh in the 
People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), was shot dead on 
10 May 2001 as he was walking home after prayers at the 
Grand Mosque in Banda Aceh. He was shot in the chest and 
died instantly. Shortly after the murder, there was a power 
cut, plunging the area into darkness. People nearby left his 
body untouched for nearly half an hour after hearing shots. 
Before his death, he had been pressing for negotiations 
between GAM and the Indonesian government as the best 
way to solve the conflict in Aceh. 
There has not been a single conviction or reported arrests 
of suspects for any of these murders, nor for the murder in 
January 2000 of Nashiruddin Daud, member of the 
Indonesian parliament and of the investigation commission 
on Aceh set up during the Habibie administration. This can 
only mean that the police are either utterly incompetent or 
are being prevented from conducting criminal investigations 
to conceal the role of the military. 
Problems with the political elite 
A likely explanation for the atrocities against Acehnese 
public figures is that many, who shrink from the idea of 
Aceh seceding from Indonesia, are voicing strong opinions 
about the continuation of the military operations. Several 
well-known figures who have given their full support to 
special autonomy for Aceh, the Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam 
(NAD) province, are equally supportive of a peaceful solu-
tion for Aceh. 
When MPR member, Ghazali Abbas Adan, who already 
describes himself as a representative of Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam (NAD), called on both sides in the conflict to 
lay down their arms immediately under the supervision of a 
third party, he was vehemently attacked by the security 
forces . Ghazali also said: 'Whichever side refuses to do so, 
for whatever reason, will expose themselves as being the 
ones who want to prolong the sufferings of the people of 
NAD.' Furthermore, he said, 'increasing the number of 
troops in Aceh only makes the situation even worse and adds 
to the number of civilian casualties'. He criticised state offi-
cials and members of parliament who are pressing the mili-
tary to resolve the conflict. Such people, he said, 'have lost 
all reason and are ignoring history'. [Analisa Online, 5 
September 2001] 
These remarks called forth a blistering attack by police 
commissioner, Sad Harun, spokesman for Opslihkam, the 
Operation for the Restoration of Order, by which the current 
military operations are known. Sad Harun said that 
Ghazali's statement 'raises serious questions about his posi-
tion in the MPR .... The protracted conflict in Aceh requires 
clear thinking. The innocent and ill-informed people of 
Aceh should not be turned into willing dupes of GAM strat-
egy.' [Analisa Online, 6 September] • 
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No change for Aceh under Megawati 
Now that Megawati Sukarnoputri is president, the chances of any improvement in Jak~rta 's policy 
towards Aceh appear to be very slim. During a brief visit to Banda Aceh, her contacts with Acehnese 
civil society were minimal and carefully selected. Meanwhile, talks between Jakarta and GAM are 
stalled following the arrest in July of GAM negotiators. 
It is clear that Aceh is a major pre-occupation and 
headache for the new administration under Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. Her chief minister for political affairs and 
security, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono recently told the press 
that Aceh is high on the agenda of every cabinet meeting. 
Under her predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid, the presi-
dency and the military were pulling in different directions 
with Wahid being keen to promote negotiations whilst the 
army was committed to the 'security approach' . In the end, 
three months before being impeached, Wahid was forced to 
issue Presidential Instruction IV /2001 (Inpres IV/2001) in 
April giving the armed forces the 'legal umbrella' they had 
been demanding to conduct a tough counter-insurgency 
human rights abuses. She acknowledged that past govern-
ment policies in Aceh had been wrong and harmful to the 
people. However, she made no mention of the need for 
justice and accountability which is what these people want 
above all else . 
In Aceh, the population was under strict orders ~o 'cele-
brate' Indonesia's national day by flying the Indonesian red-
and-white flag not just for the usual couple of days but for 
virtually the whole month of August. There were reports 
that motorcyclists and drivers were stopped by the police 
and ordered to pay a fine for not flying the flag on their 
vehicles. 
In a speech to the Indonesian community in Kuala 
Lumpur later in the month, Megawati's tone 
had changed from conciliatory to tough. 
Referring to the resistance underway in 
Aceh, she said: 'Stop the subversion or face 
appropriate and tough action by the central 
government in line with the laws of the 
Indonesian republic.' [Reuters, 28 August] 
She was making it clear that Presidential 
Instruction IV /2001 was here to stay. Since 
the start of new military operations at the 
beginning of May this year, the death toll 
especially among civilians has escalated. 
(See separate article.) 
Like virtually all members of the politi-
cal elite in Indonesia, President Megawati is 
firmly committed to preserving the Unitary 
State of the Republic oflndonesia (NKRI) at 
all costs, which explains her refusal even to 
allow the question of succession to be 
GAM Commander Abdullah Syafei, his troops well equipped with modern discussed and to rely on tough action to hold the Republic together. 
weaponry. 
campaign with total impunity. The result has been to inten-
sify military operations, to send the death toll spiralling 
upwards and to undermine the talks process. 
Now the presidency and the armed forces are on the same 
wavelength. The main thrust of Jakarta's policy under 
Megawati is to mollify the Acehnese by granting them 
special autonomy including (eventually) a larger share of 
the proceeds from its natural gas, combined with a military 
campaign to 'obliterate' GAM. Government ministers still 
insist that they have not abandoned dialogue but such claims 
ring hollow in light of the arrest and conditional release of 
the GAM negotiators. 
An apology but no talk of justice 
In a state address on 16 August to mark Indonesia's 
national day on the following day, President Megawati apol-
ogised to the people of Aceh and West Papua for years of 
This is not a position that has found favour 
with Indonesia's leading English language daily. In an edito-
rial titled 'Folly of Military Option', The Jakarta Post warned 
that with the commander of the army's strategic command 
Lt General Ryamizard Ryacudu calling for 'the total annihi-
lation' of GAM, the situation in Aceh 'is now ripe of full-
scale conflict'. 'The government's decision to pursue the 
military option. .. defies logic and is shortsighted.' It 
described the TNl's claims that it is 'winning the hearts and 
minds' of the Acehnese and 'close to crushing GAM' as 
propaganda aimed at turning public opinion in favour of the 
military opinion. 'It could be the one single major factor that 
pushes Aceh out of the republic.' [Jakarta Post, 29 August] 
According to the armed forces in Jakarta, there are now 
some 20,000 Indonesian troops in Aceh, as well as five 
warships patrolling the waters allegedly to prevent arms 
smuggling to GAM. The troops include three combat battal-
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ions and 771 soldiers who have received special training at 
the Batujajar training centre run the army's elite commando 
corps, Kopassus [Jakarta Post, 15 August]. 
Conditional release for GAM negotiators 
A few days after Megawati's state address, it was 
announced that the six men who had been negotiating on 
behalf of GAM, the Free Aceh Movement, and who had 
been arrested on 20 July while taking part in talks with the 
Indonesian side in Banda Aceh, would be released. 
However, when five of the men were released at the 
end of August, it was made clear that their release 
was conditional; charges of rebellion against them 
under Article 106 of Indonesia's Criminal Code 
have not been dropped and they were required to 
report to the police twice a week. The sixth man 
was not released and will be charged for falsifying 
a passport. 
The arrests and the charges against the six men 
are a clear breach of faith. When GAM and 
Indonesian government negotiators met in July this 
year in Geneva under the auspices of Humanitarian 
Dialogue Centre (formerly known as the Henri 
Dunant Centre), assurances of safety were given, 
even though the joint committees set up under the 
Humanitarian Pause agreement had been 
suspended. The police have turned things on their 
head, arguing that since the commitees had been 
suspended, the men are no longer recognised as 
negotiators. 
Indonesia's chief of police, General Suroyo 
Bimantoro said the men's future would depend on 
whether they had committed any wrongdoings 
during their negotiations with the government. 
'Their legal immunity was only valid when they 
were involved in negotiations with the government. 
As the negotiations have ended, such immunity has 
automatically ended,' he said. [Jakarta Post, 29 
August] 
Human rights lawyer Johnson Panjaitan, commenting on 
the five men's conditional release, said the authorities had 
been forced to release them because of international pres-
sure. 'If the charges against them are not dropped, this will 
just be an attempt to deceive the people of Aceh.' [Tempo 
lnteraktif, 21 August] 
When the last round of talks ended in Geneva on 1 July 
this year, it was said that the two sides would hold further 
talks in September. The chances of this happening any time 
this year now seem very remote indeed. 
In a statement on 13 September, GAM's chief negotiator, 
Dr Zaini Abdullah expressed support for an International 
Wise Men's Group to provide a new framework for the 
dialogue process. He said that comprehensive investigations 
of all human rights abuses were necessary to create an envi-
ronment conducive to dialogue, and stressed that 'conditions 
imposed on the release of the GAM negotiators must be 
removed and assurances must be provided for the safety and 
freedom of movement of all those involved in the dialogue 
mechanisms.' 
Special autonomy for Aceh 
In July this year, the Indonesian parliament adopted a bill 
conferring special autonomy on Aceh which was signed into 
ACEH 
law soon after Megawati took office. The province of Aceh 
is now to be known as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam or NAO. 
Special autonomy is nothing new for Aceh and was 
conferred on the province by Megawati's father, Sukarno, 
following a rebellion in the 1950s. Under Suharto, Aceh's 
'special' status ended up in its being declared a 'military 
operational zone'. The special autonomy law includes a 
provision for the implementation of syariah law in Aceh. 
This was one of the pet projects of former President Wahid, 
after he aban-
doned his 
commitment to 
support the hold-
ing of a referen-
dum in Aceh, but 
it has never been a 
demand of the 
Acehnese who are 
devout Muslims 
but among whom 
Muslim funda-
mentalism has 
never taken root. 
It is not clear 
when exactly the 
law on special 
autonomy will be 
implemented but 
Governor 
Abdullah Puteh 
clearly believes 
that the core issue 
for Aceh is that it 
should receive its 
full share of the 
70 per cent of 
natural gas 
proceeds allotted 
under the law on 
financial distribution between the centre and the regions. 
He also laments the fact that implementation of Inpres 
IV /2001 has focused solely on the security aspect although 
it was initially proclaimed by the government as being a 
'comprehensive' six-point programme covering all aspects 
of life in Aceh, including social and economic affairs. 
Megawati visits Aceh 
In a move to show the importance that she and her govern-
ment attaches to dealing with the question of Aceh, 
President Megawati visited the provincial capital, Banda 
Aceh, on 8 September. Although TNI spokesmen were 
giving assurances that the security situation in Aceh was 
good, the President's visit was limited to just five hours in 
the provincial capital. Only two thousand people were on 
the streets to greet the President, most of them school-chil-
dren given the day off for the occasion. 
Although Megawati said prior to the visit that she 
planned to hold a 'dialogue' with the Acehnese, she spent 
only one hour meeting an audience of one hundred people 
who had been screened by the governor. Only six people 
were given the opportunity to speak and the president's only 
response was that she would 'take your concerns' back to 
Jakarta for consideration. Despite the best efforts of the 
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governor, things did not go well for the president According 
to a report in The Jakarta Post, [ 10 September], pleas for the 
military campaign to be abandoned figured prominently. A 
representative ofYadesa, the only NGO present at the meet-
ing, said: 'The more troops coming to Aceh, the more 
unarmed civilians will be killed. Therefore In pres IV /2001 
should be revoked' He also said that civilians who had been 
shot and wounded by military personnel were entitled to 
compensation. 
Two others who spoke stressed the need for talks with 
GAM to be resumed, while a woman in the audience urge 
Megawati to do something about the sufferings of Acehnese 
women due to the prolonged conflict. 
The head of one of Aceh's leading human rights NGOs, 
Maimul Fidar who was not at the meeting said it would be 
pointless if she went to Aceh 'only for sightseeing'. 'She 
must talk with poor Aceh people in refugee camps and 
rights violations in Aceh must be settled legally.' 
Another Jakarta daily reported a week after the visit that 
a group of community leaders and ulama submitted a 
number of proposals to the president. They included: revo-
cation oflnpres IV/2001, an end to violence, the resumption 
of talks with GAM and punishment for all those guilty of 
acts of violence. 'They are still waiting for the government's 
response,' wrote Kompas [15 September] 
GAM under attack for violations 
In a major report titled 'The War in Aceh', the US-based 
Human Rights Watch coupled its condemnation of viola-
tions by the Indonesian security forces with an account of 
violations perpetrated by units of GAM. 
The report listed killings of suspected military infor-
mants, family members of Indonesian military personnel, 
unlawful detentions, forced expulsions especially of 
Javanese, destruction of property and systematic extortion. 
'In meetings with Human Rights Watch, senior GAM offi-
cials acknowledged that the organisation had committed 
abuses in the past but claimed that these were less the result 
of a GAM policy than the actions of GAM members acting 
on their own account. As GAM extended its control, they 
asserted, this problem was being addressed.' 
The recommendations focused on the obligation of both 
sides in the armed conflict to comply with international 
humanitarian law to ensure the safety of civilians and non-
combatants. [See www.hrw.org/reports/2001/aceh] 
GAM also came under attack for a number of threats to 
Aceh's only daily newspaper, Serambi Indonesia, which led 
to the daily suspending publication for nearly two weeks in 
August. GAM said that its field commanders had objected 
to 'biased reports', especially a report alleging that GAM 
was responsible for the Julok Massacre (see separate arti-
cle). A statement by GAM spokesman, Sofyan Dawod, 
acknowledged that the paper was under strong pressure 
from military intelligence to publish reports that comply 
with the wishes of the security force but accused it of 'no 
longer acting as an independent and neutral press, thereby 
'contravening the principles of a free press'. 
TAPOL took GAM to task for forcing the daily to close. 
In a statement on 23 August it said that 'there can be no 
justification for the ASNLF (GAM) to prevent the daily 
from appearing, thereby being guilty itself of a serious 
violation of the principle of the freedom of the press'. It 
recognised that 'the security forces are in a position to gain 
an important propaganda advantage by being able to force 
Serambi to publish only their version of events while recog-
msmg also that 'the paper and its journalists cannot be 
expected to risk their lives because of the way they report 
events in Aceh'. • 
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stood in the way of accountability for the crimes in 
East Timor and is hardly likely to help her in standing 
by the pledge she made in Washington. 
While Bush agreed to lift the executive's embargo on 
commercial sales of non-lethal defense articles for 
Indonesia, he gave no undertaking to end arms sales, 
knowing full well that this is a matter for the US 
Congress where support for the Leahy amendments 
is still strong (see page 12). If Megawati fails to 
deliver on her accountability pledge, the Leahy 
amendments will prove an impregnable barrier to 
the resumption . • 
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The key figures in Megawati's kitchen cabinet 
Indonesian analysts have rightly warned that ending the Orde Baru (New Order) in a structural sense 
means more than replacing Suharto as president. In August, the MPR, the People's Consultative 
Assembly, elected the third Indonesian president since Suharto's downfall in 1998. Many thought that 
the political demise of the man who embodied the Orde Baru would lead to its collapse but far from 
being dismantled the Orde Baru structures are more solid than ever. 
Officially, the dominant political structure during the 
three decades of the Suharto dictatorship centred around 
Golkar, the ruling party, also known as 'the party of the 
ruler' . The Golkar structure consisted of three components, 
the Golkar party structure, the vast bureaucracy and the 
military. Suharto ran the party structure through a body 
called Setneg (Sekretariat Negara, State Secretariat), whose 
head is known as Sesneg (Sekretaris Negara, State 
Megawati, the third president in three years 
Secretary). This post is comparable to the chief of staff of 
the White House in Washington. The Setneg performed a 
critically important role; more often than not key decisions 
regarding the economy or politics were taken here rather 
than in the cabinet. The State Secretary himself was always 
a key figure in Golkar, more often than not concurrently the 
chairman of the ruling party. 
In addition, the highly corporatist Orde Baru, meant that 
all civil servants were obliged to join Golkar which was the 
embodiment of a patron-client structure; the three million 
strong bureaucracy became the backbone of this structure. 
In the early sixties some anti-Communist officers created 
Sekber.Golkar to counter the rapid growth of organisations 
aligned to the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. In 
1967 Suharto and his inner core of officers turned this into 
their political vehicle, called simply Golkar. Until the down-
fall of Suharto in 1998, the TNI played a dominant role in 
Golkar. 
With the collapse of the Suharto dictatorship, Golkar lost 
its monopoly as the dominant party when the general elec-
tions were held in 1999. Its stage-managed majority of more 
than 70 per cent under Suharto fell to 26 per cent of the 
vote, placing it second after the PDI-P. Even so, it garnered 
more votes than many had predicted. Today, Golkar leaders 
no longer hold top-ranking positions in the state; civil 
servants are free to chose their own political affiliations 
while the military have loosened their ties to Golkar which 
is now just like any other party. In reality however, things 
are somewhat more complex. 
The Orde Baru 
But there is another, more crucial way of 
analysing Orde Baru's structures. The two 
dominant power structures during the Suharto 
dictatorship were military involvement in 
every aspect of life, known as Dwifungsi, the 
dual function, and a patron-client system that 
functioned through the bureaucracy. In those 
days, most decision making went through 
Golkar channels, but nowadays the old struc-
tures remain in place though without Golkar 
being in control 
During the 21-month Wahid interregnum, 
the military and the bureaucracy resisted any 
meaningful change, sabotaging and obstruct-
ing the presidency to such an extent as to 
make Wahid incapable of governing. His 
successor, Megawati, will be more cautious. 
Her cabinet appointments show that she has 
gone a long way to accommodate the military 
and the bureaucracy. 
Key posts for military 
Some key cabinet posts have gone to the military, among 
them the very influential interior ministry now headed by 
Lt. General Hari Sabarno, a military hardliner who was for 
years the spokesperson and then chairperson of the TNI in 
parliament. While most of today's military leaders seem to 
lack any skills as politicians, Hari Sabarno is a good exam-
ple of a military man who has been used to wielding power 
ever since the heyday of the Suharto era. His appointment 
as interior minister is very significant. Alongside military 
and police headquarters, this department is geared to moni-
toring, controlling and curbing activities in the regions. It 
has always been the most heavily militarised department, 
running in parallel with the army's territorial structure of 
Indonesia. One of his first moves as minister was to 
announce that he would revise the regional autonomy laws 
that came into force in January this year, in order to protect 
the unitary state against disintegration. Hari Sabarno is still 
on the active payroll of the armed forces. 
The top cabinet figures filled by retired military are Lt. 
General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Lt. General Agum 
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Gumelar both of whom were reinstated in the posts they crackdowns against the student movement in 1974 and 1978 
occupied under Wahid. Susilo is once again co-ordinating with strong military intelligence backin.g. In ~ecen:iber 
minister of political and security affai rs while Agum 1975 East Timor was invaded, after a penod of mcurs10ns 
Gumelar is back as minister of transport. These are both across the border from West Timor. The September 1984 
very strategic positions. Agum was able to use his control massacre of peaceful Muslim demonstrators in Tanjung 
of the transportation system to prevent pro-Wahid crowds Priok was the start of prolonged persecution of Muslim 
from going to Jakarta to support the activists. 
former president when he was under His official biodata reveals 
heavy pressure from his political almost nothing about the twenty 
enemies. years he served as an intelligence 
Important as these posts are, our officer at Kopassus but it can be 
intention here is to highlight two assumed that, as he rose to 
members of Megawati's cabinet who become its head of intelligence by 
will play a key role in the decision 1986, he must have been involved 
making-process at the highest level. in all these tragedies. 
The first is Lt. General (retired) In 1986, his territorial career was 
Abdullah Mahmud Hendropriyono, launched when he was assigned 
the newly appointed head of BIN head of intelligence at Kodam 
(Badan Intelijens Negara, State Jaya, the Jakarta Military 
Intelligence Agency) and BambangBambang Kesowo (left) and Hendropriyono, key Command, shortly afterthe dozens 
Kesowo, who has been appointed asp/ayers in the new cabinet of trials of Muslim activists that 
Sesneg (Sekretaris Negara, State Secretary). They both epit- followed in the wake of the Tanjung Priok Massacre. The 
omise the re-emergence of the military and the bureaucracy, following year he became the Danrem Korem 043/Garuda 
the two pillars of the Orde Barn. Hi tam, the district military commander in Lampung, South 
Sumatra. On 7 February 1989, Hendropriyono, then a 
colonel, led an attack against a local community of about 
550 people in Talangsari, Lampung. His heavily-armed men 
literally butchered the defenceless villagers. At least 200 
villagers were killed and many were imprisoned for years. 
The official version was that the local community belonged 
to an extreme Muslim sect but in fact the villagers were 
involved in a land dispute. From this time on, the human 
rights community began to call him the 'butcher of 
Lampung'. 
Lt. General (retired) Abdullah Mahmud 
Hendropriyono 
For the first time ever, the head of the key state intelligence 
body is a member of the cabinet. BIN (previously called 
BAKIN) was formerly directly under the president. In the 
Suharto days BAKIN functioned as a private intelligence 
agency for Suharto, run for almost twenty years by Lt. 
General Yoga Sugama, his close confidante. Under Wahid. 
BAKIN was renamed BIN and under Megawati , it has 
assumed far greater importance than ever. 
Quite justifiably, Wahid had a deep distrust of BAIS, the 
military intelligence body which was like a state within a 
state over which he had no grip. Everyone knows that BAIS 
is where sinister military operations and ploys are 
concocted. The revamped BIN will function as the umbrella 
for all intelligence bodies, including the army's BAIS, and 
the intelligence arms of the police, the navy, the airforce and 
home affairs. The powers of the head of BIN, (known as 
KABIN), are comparable to those of the national security 
chief in Washington. It is a position of policy-making and 
decision-making, on a par with the ministers of foreign 
affairs and defence, which explains why Kabin 
Hendropriyono has become member of the cabinet. 
Hendropriyono pushed hard to get this job and his success 
is a mark of his political importance and his closeness to 
President Megawati. Unlike most of today's top-ranking 
TNI officers who prefer to take a backseat in politics, 
Hendropriyono enjoys the limelight. He epitomises the 
image of a ranking TNI officer with a Kopassus (the army 
red beret elite troops) background plus all the skills and 
experiences of a territorial commander of the army. 
Hendropriyono was born in Yogyakarta on 7 May 1945 
and graduated from the Military Academy in 1967. He spent 
twenty years in Kopassus and was a second-year cadet in 
1965 when Suharto seized power and was clearly impressed 
by the exploits of Kopassus (then called RPKAD) in its 
brutal witchhunt against the so called Communist threat. By 
1986, when he left Kopassus, he was a top counter-insur-
gency and intelligence officer. His stint as a Kopassus intel-
ligence officer from 1967 till 1986 covered events like the 
While other atrocities from the Suharto era have been 
investigated under pressure from the victims, the Lampung 
Massacre has quietly disappeared, thanks to efforts by 
Hendropriyono to bribe the victims into dropping any idea 
of pressing for an investigation. 
There was a brief interlude in his territorial career when 
he became a director of BAIS, but soon afterwards, he was 
appointed commander of the Jakarta military command. 
Usually, Jakarta military commanders are destined for high 
office but after serving here for 18 months he was ditched 
by Suharto. Although Hendropriyono had all the necessary 
military skills, Suharto had doubts about Hendropriyono's 
loyalty. Hendropriyono was replaced by Wiranto, the officer 
who later, as armed forces commander, oversaw the destruc-
tion of East Tim or in September 1999 and the burning, loot-
ing and mass-rape in Jakarta in May 1998. 
After his removal from the top post in Jakarta, 
Hendropriyono became director of Pusdiklat (Pusat 
Pendidikan dan Latihan, Centre for Education and Training) 
a marginal post for such a senior officer. The precise nature 
of the conflict between Suharto and Hendropriyono is not 
clear but the latter had made no secret of his political ambi-
tion. As Jakarta commander, he always maintained a high 
profile and kept himself in the public eye with weekly meet-
the-people sessions every Wednesday morning and by 
attending parties and weddings. He became popular with 
the affluent middle class by making tough statements on 
eradicating petty criminals and dealing with social activists. 
This must have worried Suharto who had an aversion to 
popular officers who he saw as a threat to his own power 
base. 
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Originator of the armed militia concept 
However, in 1996 Suharto, no doubt in recognition of his 
capabilities, brought Hendropriyono back into the fold by 
appointing him Sesdalobang (Sekretaris Pengendalian 
Operasionil Pembangunan, Secretary for Operational 
Guidance of Development) . This made him in effect the 
president's assistant to deal with regional security matters. 
He became a kind of roving operator, observing and moni-
toring likely places of unrest in remote parts of the country. 
His concept of arming civilians emerged during this period. 
It is no accident that Hendopriyono's skills were utilised 
again by Suharto. Hendropriyono is largely responsible for 
designing and promoting the concept of an armed civilian 
militia. As the largest archipelago in the world, many mili-
tary strategists acknowledge on-going security problems 
across the 13,000 islands. With both Suharto and 
Hendropriyono being obsessed by security problem, it was 
Hendropriyono who thought up the idea of creating armed 
civilian militia, in particular in so-called trouble spots. In 
December 1998, while serving as transmigration minister in 
the Habibie cabinet, he launched this idea of his . 'Security 
is important', he told the press, 'Security can only be guar-
anteed if people protect their own property and uphold 
democracy.' The civilian militia would be a multipurpose 
organisation, he said, because it could be used to handle 
anarchic situations and unrest. It was also his idea to give 
the militia uniforms and ranks while keeping them under 
the supervision of armed forces headquarters. The East 
Timorese militia and the militia units in Aceh grew out of 
Hendropriyono's concept. 
In between holding these jobs, Hendropriyono acquired 
degrees in law and economics. After the 1999 elections he 
set up a law office called HELO (Hendropriyono Law 
Office) which he used extensively for self-promotion. He 
became close to Megawati during this period and was soon 
regarded as one of her closest military advisors. 
During his long career as a territorial officer he created 
extensive business interests, in particular with Indonesian 
Chinese businessmen in Jakarta. Hendropriyono is now 
very wealthy and it remains to be seen ho~ much o~ t?is 
wealth he will declare under new regulations requmng 
office holders to reveal the extent of their personal fortunes . 
Another of Hendropriyono's contributions was the drafting 
of the constitutional amendment establishing the principle of 
non-retroactivity for crimes against humanity which was 
adopted by the MPR at its session in 2000. With no ~ne 
noticing what was happening, it was the armed forces/pohce 
group in the assembly, headed by Hari Sabarno, who pushed 
the amendment through. This amendment could frustrate all 
efforts to try the perpetrators of past crimes, despite recent 
moves to set up ad hoc human rights courts. 
Hendropriyono's appointment as head of BIN_ and mem~er 
of the cabinet is bad news for democracy m Indonesia. 
Military intelligence officers have always pla):'ed a keJ'. ~ole 
in determining the course of Indonesian poht1cs. 
Hendropriyono is a continuation of the disastrous role of 
predecessors like General Ali Murtopo and General Benny 
Murdani . His track record shows him to be a ruthless man 
with a strong preference for the 'security approach'. Sooner 
rather than later the pro-democracy forces are likely to feel 
the effects of Hendropriyono's policies. 
Bambang Kesowo . 
Bambang Kesowo is the new Sesneg (Sekretans Negara, 
POLITICS 
State Secretary) and was previously the secretary of Vice-
President Megawati . He was born in Sragen, East Java on 27 
March 1945. He got a law degree at Gadjah Mada 
University, Yogyakarta and did a PhD in business law at the 
Harvard Law School. While still a young man in 1968, he 
joined the staff of Setneg, where he remained throughout 
the Suharto era, eventually becoming Megawati's secretary 
on her assumption of the vice-presidency. 
While the military apparatus is often described as 'a state 
within a state' , Setneg is the actual state in a nutshell. At its 
peak in the eighties, all important political and economic 
decisions were taken in Setneg. Gradually Setneg powers 
spread in all directions, like an octopus. As Suharto's rule 
became increasingly personal, he used the state secretary as 
his main tool of power. All projects above 500 million rupi-
ahs needed his approval. All projects outside the official 
budget also went through him while all presidential aid 
projects were handled within the Setneg pipeline. The many 
yayasan (foundations) set up by Suharto which he used to 
acquire funds in order to buy loyalty, were also controlled 
by Setneg. 
Setneg also played a key political role as the politburo of 
the bureaucracy. Large chunks of the money acquired by 
Setneg were used for political purposes, such as buying 
loyalties, strengthening patron-client relations within 
Golkar, keeping an eye on mass organisations, supplying 
money for intelligence operations. By the time Suharto was 
forced to step down, Setneg had a staff of 4000, all working 
one way or another for the president. 
As head of this super-ministry, Bambang Kesowo has 
become Indonesia's most powerful bureaucrat, indeed much 
more powerful than other cabinet ministers whose powers 
are confined to single ministries . Bambang Kesowo fits the 
cliche: 'Ministers come and go but civil servants go on for 
ever.' 
He has already served under three presidents, moving 
upwards all the time. When Suharto was ditched in 1998 
his career was nearing the top as deputy cabinet secretary. 
When Megawati became vice-president one year later, he 
was asked to become her private secretary, using Setneg as 
his office. He created a large structure of five divisions 
around her vice-presidency, much to her satisfaction. With 
his boss now president, his promotion to the highest rung on 
the ladder of the power structure was inevitable. People 
whisper that Bambang has become the second closest man 
to Megawati after her husband, Taufik Kiemas. 
During his many years in Setneg, Bambang Kesowo 
became familiar with all the ins and outs of the power game. 
He became an integral part of the nepotistic culture that 
blossomed round the Suharto clique and built contacts with 
all the important players in business and politics . He was 
involved in drafting government regulations and designing 
many national projects, including the highly controversial 
Timor national car project which was the pet project of 
Suharto's youngest son, Tommy Suharto, now a fugitive 
from justice. The significance of this carryover of the top 
figure in the bureaucracy from the Orde Baru to the 
Megawati presidency cannot be under-estimated. 
Most assessments of Megawati's cabinet have praised the 
professionalism and even-handedness of its composition. 
What they ignore is the key placement of two people who 
are the very embodiment of the military-bureaucracy align-
ment that served Suharto so well. • 
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A Human Rights Agenda for Megawati 
In August, TAPOL wrote to the newly-elected President Megawati to draw her attention to a number 
of issues that must be addressed to ensure that Indonesia's transition to democracy is based on 
respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law. This is the text of our letter : 
Priority areas: Aceh, West Papua, and West Timor 
We are gravely concerned that former President Wahid's 
conciliatory approach to solving conflict in areas, such as 
Aceh and West Papua, has given way to the military solu-
tion. Apart from being counter-productive, this invariably 
involves widespread violations of fundamental rights. We 
urge you to negotiate solutions to the problems in these 
areas and to ensure that human rights are observed and 
actively promoted at all times. In particular, we call upon 
you to: 
• Halt the current military operations in Aceh under 
Presidential Instruction IV /2001 and the security operations 
in the Wasior region of West Papua. 
• Withdraw all non-organic troops from both territories. 
• Ensure that the peoples of Aceh and West Papua are able 
to peacefully exercise their rights to freedom of expression 
- including their right to express their support for indepen-
dence - freedom of association, freedom of assembly and 
other fundamental rights and that they are protected from 
extra-judicial executions, torture, and arbitrary detention. 
• Ensure that members of the police and armed forces 
strictly observe international human rights and humanitar-
ian laws, especially insofar as they relate to civilians and 
other non-combatants. 
• Guarantee the security and freedom from arrest, intimi-
dation and violence of human rights defenders and human-
itarian workers so that they can carry out their work effec-
tively and without fear of reprisals. 
• Guarantee the security and freedom from arrest of those 
involved in negotiations with government representatives so 
that there is no repeat of the recent arrest of negotiators of 
the Free Aceh Movement in Banda Aceh. 
• Allow independent investigations into recent massacres, 
especially the Julok massacre in East Aceh, and invite to 
Indonesia the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial 
Executions to investigate recent atrocities and to report on 
issues associated with her mandate. 
• Respond to the request made in November 2000 by the 
UN experts on torture, extra-judicial executions, violence 
against women, human rights defenders and arbitrary deten-
tions for the Indonesian Government to investigate allega-
tions of, and provide information on, abuses committed in 
Aceh within the experts' mandates. 
• Implement the recommendations of the report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women following 
her visit to Indonesia in 1998, invite . the Special 
Rapporteur for a follow-up visit, and invite the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and the Special Representative on 
Human Rights Defenders to visit Indonesia and report on 
the human rights situation in relation to their fields of 
expertise. 
• Lift all restrictions on foreign-based journalists visiting 
Aceh and West Papua. 
• Continue the process of creating a civilian police force, 
which functions to protect citizens and not to restrict, by 
repressive means, legitimate social or political protest. 
We remain concerned that there is no apparent end to the 
refugee crisis in West Timor nearly two years after the 
refugees were forcibly expelled from East Timor. The regis-
tration process in June 2001 did nothing to contribute to the 
safe repatriation or re-settlement of the refugees. The power 
and influence of the militias operating in the territory 
remains largely unchallenged. We, therefore, urge you to: 
• Fulfil Indonesia's responsibility to disarm and disband 
the militias. 
• Provide secure conditions for the return of humanitarian 
agencies to West Timor and for refugees to make a free and 
informed choice about whether they wish to stay in 
Indonesia or return to East Timor. 
• Protect the security of those refugees who decide to 
return to East Timor and take proper measures to ensure 
their safe repatriation. 
Ending Impunity 
Human rights violations will not end while those responsi-
ble for past violations are protected from due process and 
punishment. We urge you to end impunity by: 
• Revising the Indonesian Constitution to ensure that the 
non-retroactivity principle does not apply to acts or omis-
sions which were crimes under international criminal law at 
the time they were committed (see Article 15(2) ICCPR). 
• Revising the Law on Human Rights Courts so that it 
complies fully with international standards (see recommen-
dations in: Amnesty International - Indonesia: Comments 
on the.Law on Human Rights Courts (Law no. 26/2000)). 
• Ending the practice of using koneksitas courts, or any 
other form of military tribunal, for human rights cases and 
any other cases which are not strictly concerned with mili-
tary discipline. 
• Conducting investigations, establishing human rights 
courts or ad hoc courts, and bringing to justice those 
responsible for gross violations of human rights, including 
those in positions of political or military command respon-
sibility, in particular in relation to: 
·· the massacres perpetrated in the months following the 
seizure of power by former President Suharto in 1965; 
·· the numerous atrocities and human rights abuses commit-
ted in Aceh and West Papua since the 1960s; 
·· Other grave incidents such as the Tanjung Priok massacre 
in 1984 for which an ad hoc court has already been estab-
lished, the Lampung killings in 1987, the attack on the 
offices of the PDI party in July 1996, the disappearance of 
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pro-democracy act1V1sts in 1998, the Trisakti/Semanggi 
student killings in 1998/99, and the killings, torture and 
arbitrary detentions revealed by the Commission of Inquiry 
into events in Abepura, West Papua in December 2000. 
Justice for East Timor 
It is our view that those responsible for serious crimes 
committed in East Timar must be made to account before an 
ad hoc international criminal tribunal. We have long felt that 
there are too many political and legal obstacles in the way of 
credible trials in Indonesia. This has meant that, more than 
two years since some of the crimes were committed, there 
have been no indictments, let alone trials in Indonesia. 
The decree issued by former President Wahid establishing 
an ad hoc court for East Timor restricted the court's juris-
diction to crimes committed after the ballot in August 1999. 
This meant that many serious crimes, the planning of the 
violence, and the organisation of the militia forces in prepa-
ration for the ballot, would not be covered. The decree fell 
far short of a commitment made by Indonesia at the UN 
Commission on Human Rights in April 2001 " ... to ensure 
that the violators of human rights and humanitarian law 
committed during the violence in 1999 are accounted for. .. " 
With respect, we would argue that your amendment of the 
Wahid decree did not improve matters. You have revised the 
temporal jurisdiction of the court so that it covers April and 
September (but not October) 1999, and you have restricted 
the territorial jurisdiction to crimes committed in Dili, 
Liquica and Suai only. Again this means that many crimes 
are not covered. 
We remain concerned that there are no plans to prosecute 
those in the highest positions of command responsibility for 
the East Timor violence, such as General Wiranto and 
Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, both of whom were 
named in the report of Indonesia's Commission for Human 
Rights Violations in East Timor (KPP-HAM). 
We also regret that the Indonesia has failed to co-operate 
with the authorities in East Timor in accordance with the 
memorandum of understanding on legal co-operation 
signed with UNTAET in April 2000. 
We believe that an international tribunal will remain the 
only option unless the above points and others mentioned in 
this letter are properly addressed. The temporal jurisdiction 
of the ad hoc court should, at the very least, coincide with 
the mandate of KPP-HAM - which covered violations of 
human rights between January and October 1999 - and all 
those named in the KPP-HAM report should be brought to 
justice. Measures should also be taken to instigate a process 
of accountability for serious crimes committed in East 
Timar since 1975. 
Political crimes and political prisoners 
We are extremely concerned by the recent tendency of the 
authorities to criminalise peaceful political activities. This 
has given rise to a new generation of political prisoners. 
The suppression of political activity and expression in this 
way has no place in a country based on democratic princi-
ples and we urge your administration to: 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
• Release all political prisoners and all those awaiting trial 
on political charges (whether in prison or under any other 
form of detention) immediately and unconditionally, in 
particular: 
··Muhammad Nazar, Faisal Saifuddin and Kautsar of Aceh; 
·· the five Papuan Presidium leaders and 17 others convicted 
in relation to events in Wamena, West Papua in October 
2000; 
·· eight political activists arrested in Bondowoso, East Java 
in August 2001 for distributing anti-government lealets; 
·· 12 activists currently in detention in Bandung following 
their arrests for demonstrating against new labour laws and 
fuel price increases; 
·· Purwadi, the head of the People's Democratic Party in East 
Java. 
• Drop criminal charges against all those facing charges in 
relation to their peaceful political activities, including the 
five Papuan Presidium leaders on trial in Jayapura. 
• Repeal all articles in the Penal Code and other penal 
provisions which make the expression of political opinions 
or political activities a criminal offence, especially Article 
106 (rebellion), Articles 134 and 137 (insulting the 
President and Vice-President) Articles 154, 155 and 160 
(the "hate-sowing" Articles) and Articles 107a to 107f(arti-
cles incorporated into the Penal Code when the anti-subver-
sion law was repealed in 1999). 
• Lift all restrictions on journalists and international trial 
observers attending trials and ensure that all trials are fully 
open to the public and conducted in accordance with inter-
national fair trial standards. 
Other legal and judicial reforms 
Whatever improvements are made to Indonesia's laws and 
legal procedures, the rule of law cannot prevail unless 
professional, independent and impartial legal personnel are 
available to carry out investigations, prosecutions and trials. 
You are aware of the serious problems of corruption within 
the judiciary and the prosecution service and we urge you to 
give the highest priority to institutional reform. In particu-
lar, we recommend that: 
• Judges should be appointed on the recommendation of an 
independent judicial commission comprising members of 
the judiciary, representatives of the private legal profession 
and representatives of civil society. 
• Judges should be given security of tenure for lengthy 
terms and should be dismissed only if they are no longer 
worthy of judicial office. 
• Judges, prosecutors and defence lawyers should undergo 
intensive training in international human rights law and 
practice. 
•All laws, regulations and practices relating to the function 
and conduct of the legal profession should be consistent 
with the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors and the 
Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers. 
To protect the rights of defendants, victims and witnesses, 
we recommend: 
• The early review and revision of the Criminal Procedure 
Code (KUHAP) so that it complies with international 
continued on p13 
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West keen to enhance military ties 
Hawkish elements in the Bush administration are supporting a campaign emanating from the 
Pentagon to resume full co-operation with the Indonesian military, despite a lack of progress on 
human rights and military reform. There are also signs that the UK may be looking to upgrade its 
military relationship with Jakarta. 
Western diplomats were quick to welcome Megawati's 
Sukarnoputri's peaceful accession to the presidency of 
Indonesia on 23 July and have since worked hard at devel-
oping a close relationship with her new administration. 
According to one US official, 'She hasn't put a foot wrong 
yet' [International Herald Tribune, 7 September 2001]. She 
is likely to be given special treatment when she meets 
President Bush in the US on 19 September. 
The question of military ties is likely to feature high on the 
agenda of their discussions. Secretary of Defence, Donald 
Rumsfeld made the administration's position clear on a visit 
to Australia at the end of July when he said he favoured the 
early re-establishment of training assistance, as well as the 
supply of weapons and equipment, to the Indonesian mili-
tary (TNI) . Numerous media reports have appeared in the 
US in recent months concerning the possible resumption of 
military co-operation despite the existence of stringent 
restrictions on military training and financing. 
US interests override human rights 
The administration's position is no doubt driven by 
Indonesia's strategic importance to the US and by the view 
that Indonesia's integrity is vital to regional stability. With 
its abundant natural resources it is also regarded as a prime 
location for foreign investment. Both Megawati, as a 
nationalist committed to Indonesia's territorial integrity, and 
the TNI, as a powerful political player and the only force 
regarded as capable of guaranteeing the country's integrity, 
are seen as essential partners in protecting US interests in 
the region. 
These considerations appear to override concerns the US 
may have about human rights in much the same way as they 
did during the Suharto dictatorship. 
It is significant that two of Indonesia's largest foreign 
investment projects - the Freeport copper-and-gold mining 
operation in West Papua and the Exxon Mobil natural gas 
operation in Aceh - are controlled by US multinationals and 
are based in areas of conflict where they are safeguarded by 
the Indonesian army. Indonesian law requires that strategic 
assets such as these are protected by Indonesian security 
forces and it is a matter of record that numerous human 
rights violations have been committed by security forces in 
their vicinity. 
Case against co-operation stronger than 
ever 
Contrary to the impression created by some in the US 
administration and by certain journalists and diplomats -
who have portrayed the military as defenders of democracy 
because they refused to support former President Wahid's 
attempt to impose a state of emergency - the case against 
enhancing military ties is now stronger than ever. 
In reality the military did everything in their power 
throughout Wahid's presidency to thwart his efforts to push 
forward with a programme of reform. During the latter part 
of the Wahid interregnum, the military were able to regain 
much of their former influence and are now in a much 
stronger political position than they were when the US mili-
tary restrictions were imposed following the devastation of 
East Timor in 1999. In a recent report on the armed forces, 
Jane's Defence Weekly describes the TNI as 'more powerful 
than ever, particularly when compared to Indonesia's inef-
fective civilian institutions' [Jane's, Vol. 36. No.9, 30 August 
2001]. 
Megawati's accession to the presidency was largely the 
result of the anti-reform strategy of the military and 
elements associated with the New Order regime of former 
President Suharto. The TNI's current appalling record in 
Aceh and other parts of Indonesia is detailed elsewhere in 
this Bulletin. 
Restrictions still in force 
The US State Department may be more cautious about the 
early resumption of military ties. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell has said that the US wants to improve bilateral ties, 
but not at the expense of human rights [ AFP, 30 July]. 
Certainly, there is still strong opposition within Congress to 
the lifting of current restrictions. Activists and grassroots 
organisations in the US have played a vital role in raising 
Congressional awareness of the dangers of re-engagement. 
TAPOL has written to Secretary Powell expressing its 
concern about a change in policy. 
In any event, it will be difficult for the administration to 
overcome the current restrictions. The US Government 
curtailed military ties with Indonesia in the early 1990s and 
suspended them following TNI involvement in the violent 
destruction of East Timor in 1999. According to a 
Congressional amendment to the Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Act ('the Leahy amendment') bilateral mili-
tary financing and training cannot be resumed until certain 
conditions - concerning the trials of those responsible for 
the East Timor violence and the resolution of the refugee 
crisis in West Timor - are met. Commercial arms sales and 
other military ties are restricted by a 1999 executive order 
of President Clinton. 
Senator Tom Harkin, a senior member of the US Senate's 
Appropriation Defence Committee, insists that the embargo 
will remain in force . . 'Ifthey believe they're going to be able 
to (resume) military ·(sales) and they're going to be able to 
just move ahead and spend US taxpayer's dollars to do that 
without us throwing a monkey wrench in the works, they're 
sadly mistaken.' [Interview with the ABC's 'World Today', 
7 September 2001] 
In July, the International Crisis Group (ICG) published an 
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important briefing paper titled 'Indonesian-US Military 
Ties', which highlighted Indonesia's lack of progress in 
meeting the Leahy conditions. The same month, the House 
of Representatives continued the Leahy restrictions for 
fiscal year 2002. The matter will be considered by the 
Senate shortly and the conditions for the resumption of 
military ties may even be strengthened to take account of 
concern about atrocities being committed in Aceh, Maluku 
and West Papua. 
Notwithstanding the current restrictions, there has been a 
degree of phased re-engagement over a period of months 
with the authorisation of the sale of certain spare parts, 
participation in joint regional naval exercises and military-
to-military contacts. This insidious undermining of the 
restrictions is disturbing and must be challenged at every 
step. 
Re-engagement will signal approval of current Indonesian 
military operations and further embolden the TNI. In any 
event, it is unlikely to meet US objectives. The ICG paper 
rightly points out that ' ... the bilateral military relationship 
has not been effective to date in producing an Indonesian 
military that meets the standards of a modern, professional 
force under civilian control or promoting long-term stabil-
ity in Indonesia'. soldiers marching, West Papua. 
There is also concern in Congress about US training of 
Indonesian police officers. In a letter to Secretary Powell at 
the end of July, several members said they recognised the 
Indonesian Government had taken positive steps to separate 
the police from the military, but pointed out that 'this has 
not yet translated into a professional civilian police force 
that functions under the rule of law'. Recent rights viola-
tions committed by the police, particularly by Brimob, the 
special forces of the police, in Aceh and West Papua, 'put 
into question the wisdom of extending such [police] train-
ing from the United States at this time,' they said. 
UK urged to impose restrictions 
Despite concerns about its moves to re-engage with the 
TNI, the US has taken a valuable lead in maintaining sanc-
tions until now. Unfortunately that lead has not been 
followed by other countries, which are not averse to filling 
the gap left by the US. The East Timor-related European 
Union arms embargo was lifted after just four months in 
January 2000 and since then the supply of military equip-
ment has continued uninterrupted. 
During a visit to Jakarta by a Foreign Office minister, Ben 
Bradshaw, a Jakarta Post report on 29 August incorrectly 
stated that Britain was about to 'resume' arms sales (sales 
have in fact never stopped), but it raised serious questions 
about the UK Government's arms export policy and the 
ARMS SALES 
nature of its ties with the TNI. The implication was that 
there has been a shift in UK policy towards a more intensive 
engagement with the TNI. This has been denied by the 
Foreign Office, which insists it no longer sells major items 
of equipment, such as tanks, because of the risk of internal 
repression, and that it is not involved in military training. 
TAPOL has written to the Foreign Office stating that UK 
ties with the TNI are already unacceptably close. It says 
there should be a prohibition on the export of all kinds of 
military equipment, including spare parts and upgrade 
equipment. TAPOL urged the British government to follow 
the lead of the US and to send a consistent message with the 
US that meaningful co-operation will not be countenanced 
until substantial reforms of the military have been achieved 
and senior military officers have been brought to justice for 
past violations and crimes against humanity in East Timor 
and elsewhere. • 
continued from p.11 ... 
standards, particularly those relating to detention and fair trial 
set out in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment. 
• The implementation of the recommendations of the report 
of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions following its 
visit to Indonesia in 1999. 
• An invitation to the Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions 
to make a follow-up visit to Indonesia. 
• The provision of an effective protection programme for 
victims and witnesses, operated independently of the police 
and security forces, with special attention being given to the 
needs of children and the victims of gender-related violence. 
National Plan of Action 
We urge you to implement the Indonesian National Plan of 
Action on Human Rights, 1998-2003, launched by former 
President Habibie in June 1998. In particular, we call upon 
your administration to: 
• Accede to the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights ('ICCPR') and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
the Genocide Convention and other instruments referred to in 
the Plan of Action. 
• Promote and protect the human rights set out in the above 
instruments before the ratification process is completed. 
• Implement all international human rights instruments 
already ratified by Indonesia, in particular the Convention 
Against Torture, the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
• Ensure that Indonesian domestic law and practice fully 
comply with Indonesia's obligations under the above instru-
ments and with its other obligations under international 
human rights law. 
We thank you for your kind attention to these matters and 
hope that you find our recommendations helpful. We would 
value your response to our suggestions and we look forward 
to a dialogue with you and your ministers on these critical 
issues. • 
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Timorese go to the polls 
On 30 August 2001, the people of East Timor went to the polls in huge numbers to vote for a 
Constituent Assembly. Ten days later, the UN electoral commission declared that the ballot had 
been free and fair. The elections were a great success with more than ~O per cent of the ~lector~te 
taking part and practically no violence. The 88 members of the Constituent Assembly will decide 
on the next steps to full independence which is likely to happen in 2002 
In East Timor today two years after the devastating events 
in September 1999, reconstruction is underway, roads have 
been repaired, economic activity is vibrant, schools have 
been rebuilt and water, electricity and irrigation systems are 
functioning again. The university has reopened and health 
clinics are getting started. The markets are full of goods 
from local suppliers as well as from Indonesia and 
Australia. 
However, such was the extent of the destruction wrought 
by the Indonesian military and militia that it will take 
decades before reconstruction is completed. Economic 
opportunities are very limited and many are living in dire 
poverty. The continued presence of thousands of UN 
personnel, executives and staff of foreign businesses and 
international agencies has brought its own problems in the 
form of a two-tier society especially in Dili, where boom-
town conditions prevail. While foreigners and a small 
number of East Timorese earn huge salaries, the majority of 
East Timorese have a hard time making ends meet. 
As compared with UN missions elsewhere, the UNTAET 
experience in East Timor has on the whole been a positive 
one. The appointment of East Timorese as ministers in the 
transitional administration has helped to reduce the danger 
of top-down administration and ensured that local commu-
nities have been involved in reconstruction programmes. 
The East Timorese have made known their political and 
economic demands to the UN and the international aid 
organisations, demanding a proper share in the administra-
tion, demanding transparency and focusing on small busi-
ness enterprises run by local people. UN bureaucrats may 
have learned a great deal from their time in East Timor, 
especially in involving the local people in rebuilding and 
reconstruction. This was the context in which the elections 
took place in East Timor. 
UNTAET has set a time limit of 90 days for the 
Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution. The Assembly 
will then decide on the next step to nationhood. It is widely 
expected that, after completing its work, the Assembly will 
reconstitute itself as the country's national parliament, 
avoiding the necessity of conducting another general elec-
tion. 
In its drafting of a constitution, the Assembly may follow 
in the footsteps of Portugal in 1974, after the demise of the 
fascist dictatorship. The Portuguese opted for a semi-presi-
dential system where both president and prime minister 
share state power and responsibilities. Following the elec-
tions, the head of UNTAET swore in an East Timorese 
council of ministers, replacing the former transitional coun-
cil which consisted of Timorese and non-Timorese who 
were handpicked by the UN. 
Multi-party elections . 
More than two decades of living under an oppressive 
Indonesian occupation had the effect of politicising the 
population. Despite deep poverty, widesp~ead illite~acy and 
an education system geared towards turnmg the Timorerse 
into 'good Indonesians', the Timorese people devel?ped 
many layers of creative opposition against the Indonesians. 
In the final years of the occupation, an umbrella body was 
created, the CNRT, the Timorese National Resistance 
Council which unified all shades of political opinion and 
social classes, from deeply religious Christians to orthodox 
Marxists, political parties from right across the spectrum, 
the former pro-Portuguese and pro-Indonesian parties to the 
several pro-independence parties. . 
As election time drew near and the CNRT was disbanded, 
sixteen parties came forward to register for the elections. 
They even included a monarchist party and a pro-autonomy 
(pro Indonesia) party. 
Fretilin's victory widely predicted 
From the outset, it was clear that Fretilin would gain the 
most seats. The big question was whether it would win a 
two-thirds majority which would have put it into a 
commanding position over the future constitution. 
Fretilin, the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East 
Timor, had led the struggle against the Indonesian occupa-
tion for almost 24 years, and had been the main target of the 
Indonesian military, suffering enormous hardship and loss 
of life. In the late seventies, the Fretilin leadership was 
decimated and most first-generation leaders died at the 
hands of the occupiers. 
In the early eighties, under the leadership of Xanana 
Gusmao, one of the few leaders to survive, Fretilin was 
reorganised and developed a vast underground network 
called NUREP (Nuclei Resistencia Popular, Cells of 
People's Resistance). These cells became the backbone of 
the resistance and succeeded in infiltrating the Indonesian 
administration to the very top, even penetrating the gover-
nor's office. So desperate were the Indonesian military that 
they distrusted every East Timorese. At its peak, NUREP is 
thought to have involved at least 10,000 ordinary citizens, 
some of whom provided logistical support to the Falintil 
guerrillas in the mountains. Most members infiltrated the 
Indonesian civilian and military apparatus. The NUREP 
network, along with the student movement that emerged in 
the late eighties, conducted the struggle for independence 
right up to the final defeat of the Indonesian military in 
1999. 
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The election results 
The total number of votes cast 
was 384,248, of which 20,747 
were declared invalid. The 
results were as follows: 
Party Seats Percentage 
PDC 2 1.98 
UDT 2 2.36 
PD 7 8.72 
Fretilin 43 57.37 
Kota 2 2.13 
PNT 2 2.21 
PSD 6 8.18 
UDC/PDC 1 0.66 
PPT 2 1.78 
PST 1 2.01 
ASDT 6 7.84 
PL 1 1.10 
Besides seats that were filled on the East Timorese going 
basis of proportional representation, thir- to the polls 
teen seats were allocated to the 13 
districts. Fretilin won overwhelmingly in 12 districts, while 
the seat in Oecussi was won by an independent candidate. 
Four parties: Apodeti, Parenti!, PTT and PDM failed to get 
enough votes to win a seat in the Assembly. Should general 
elections be held in the near future, they are likely to 
produce similar results. Some parties clearly have deep 
roots in Timorese society while others are little more than 
extended families or leftovers from former, traditional 
structures. 
With the lion's share of the seats held by Fretilin, its pres-
ident Lu'olo (whose real name is Francisco Guterres) 
promised that it would form an all-inclusive government 
that is transparent and efficient, free from corruption and 
nepotism. Fretilin secretary-general Mari Alkatiri is slated 
to become the country's first prime minister. He was one of 
the founders of Fretilin in 1974. At the time of the 
Indonesian invasion in December 1975 he was abroad. For 
many years he functioned as Fretilin's representative in 
Mozambique while frequently representing the East 
Timorese resistance on the international arena. He was the 
minister for economic affairs in the transitional UNTAET 
government and was responsible, along with a UN official, 
for negotiating a new treaty about the Timor Gap oil 
reserves with the Australian government and oil companies. 
For many years Fretilin and its armed wing Falintil, were the 
only organisations of resistance. In the mid eighties the 
political parameters changed. In the interests of national 
unity against the occupation, new initiatives were taken. 
Falintil became the national army of resistance The major-
ity of the guerrillas continued to be loyal to Fretilin, while 
some shifted their focus to non-party activities. 
The best-known East Timorese leaders, Xanana Gusmao 
(inside East Timor) and Jose Ramos Horta (who lived in the 
diaspora) were both founders of Fretilin and continued as 
party members for many years. Each of them, for their own 
reasons, left the party. In Xanana's case, he saw this move as 
being important for the sake of national unity. He became 
chairman of the CNRM, later renamed CNRT, the umbrella 
organisation for all East Timorese organisations in the resis-
tance. Horta had left the party some years earlier, preferring 
to hold himself aloof from the parties. Horta became East 
EASTTIMOR 
Timor's outstanding diplomat, a familiar figure throughout 
the decades of the Indonesian occupation in international 
gatherings, at the Security Council and the General 
Assembly and wherever it was necessary to speak on his 
people's behalf. In 1996, he won the Nobel Peace Prize, 
along with Bishop Belo. He became the key representative 
of Xanana's policies of unity. Had these two men stood as 
Fretilin representatives, the election results would have been 
even more heavily weighted in Fretilin's favour. 
Fretilin's programme includes support for pluralism. toler-
ance, dialogue and peace. It has pledged itself to support 
East Timor's ratification of all the major UN treaties and 
covenants. Its economic programme focuses on the devel-
opment of agriculture, fishing, co-operatives, literacy, 
tourism, sustainable development of natural resources and 
foreign investment. 
PD, ASDT and PSD 
It's worth taking a closer look at the possible alliance part-
ners of Fretilin, the three parties that achieved relatively 
good results: PD (Partido Democratico ), PSD (Partido 
Social Democrata Timor Lorosae) and ASDT (Associacao 
Social Democrata de Timor). 
PD (Partido Democratico) 
PD was founded only three months prior to the elections 
but took second place with almost 32,000 votes and seven 
seats. The fact that it was able to achieve such good results 
despite its short existence means that PD activists are well 
known in Timorese society. Its following is largely from the 
students and women's organisations notably from Renetil, 
the student movement that carried out numerous actions in 
the big cities of Indonesia in favour of East Timorese inde-
pendence. Renetil became an essential part of the indepen-
dence movement and together with the clandestine network 
inside East Timor (the NUREPs) they formed a coalition 
that made life very difficult for the Indonesian authorities. 
It might have been expected that Renetil members would 
join Fretilin after the Indonesians left East Timor in 1999, 
but this did not happen. In the course of the struggle many 
differences emerged, often marginal but sometimes quite 
substantial. One clear difference is the generation conflict. 
The Renetil members, today's PD activists, describe them-
selves as the post-75 generation, meaning that they grew up 
or were born after the Indonesian invasion. This description 
by itself has many implications. At a congress in 2000, the 
idea of Renetil becoming a political party debated at great 
length .. In the end, the proposal was postponed. When it 
emerged as a party two years later, the PD had little time to 
campaign but the fact that its leaders and members were 
popular in many districts ensured it a good result. 
Renetil leader Fernando Araujo (arrested after the Santa 
Cruz massacre and jailed for 6 years in Jakarta) in an inter-
view with Watch Indonesia makes it clear that one of the 
reasons for creating PD was to counter the domination of 
Fretilin. In the process of democratisation it is very 
unhealthy for one party to dominate the political scene, he 
said. He describes some Fretilin people as suffering from 
'veteranism', implying that they were the generation that 
suffered and sacrificed the most. 
Another difference between Fretilin and the PD is in ideol-
ogy. Fretilin is often described as a leftwing party with 
Marxist and social democratic tendencies. PD is more prag-
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matic although some members have leftwing credentials 
similar to radicals in the pro-democracy movement in 
Indonesia. Again, the generation gap plays a role; while the 
Fretilin generation see themselves as the power-holders, the 
younger generation are pushing for rejuvenation. 
Some points from the PD political programme: participa-
tory democracy, respect for human rights, a market econ-
omy with state intervention, equality in education, social 
welfare based on solidarity and a reliable security/defence 
system. 
PSD (Social-Democratic Party) 
The PSD is also a relatively new party, set up in 2000, but 
with a few well-known vote-getters, notably Mario 
Carrascalao who served as East Timor's governor for two 
terms under the Indonesian administration in the eighties, 
and won respect for the way he protected East Timorese. 
Many board members were living in the diaspora, mostly in 
Australia. Despite the excellent skills they had gained while 
abroad its foremost leaders were not well known to people 
in the countryside. At one point it was expected that Jose 
Ramos Horta would join PSD, which certainly would have 
helped attract votes but in the end, the Nobel peace prize 
laureate decided not to join any of the parties. 
The PSD leaders have developed a close working relation-
ship with Xanana Gusmao and Horta, giving them a strong 
bargaining position with Fretilin in the formation of East 
Timor's first post-independence government. It is widely 
assumed that Xanana will become the country's first presi-
dent when a presidential election is held (assuming that the 
constitution provides for this), while Horta's diplomatic 
skills are likely to be seen as indispensable for the new 
nation-state. 
Some points in its programme: support for the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, pluralism, participatory 
democracy, social justice, the setting of a minimum wage, 
and rights for women, children and minorities. 
ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic Association) 
A new party using Fretilin's original name. The chairman 
is Francisco Xavier do Amaral, the first Fretilin President in 
197 5. He surrendered to Indonesian troops in 197 6 and was 
held in semi-captivity for many years in the home of 
General Darling Kalbuadi a prominent Indonesian officer 
who spearheaded the invasion of East Timor. In the eighties 
he was often send abroad by the Indonesian authorities to 
attend meetings of the UN Commission of Human Rights in 
Geneva and present the version of the authorities about 
conditions in the territory. 
It is not easy to place ASDT on the political map. Many of 
the issues it raises are part of the old Fretilin political 
agenda. But it would be incorrect to describe ASDT as a 
Fretilin offspring as most of its members and leaders were 
not part of Fretilin in the old days. There is a lot of animos-
ity between Fretilin and ASDT. 
While Fretilin leaders have become 'respectable' and are 
preparing themselves to run the country, ASDT members 
engage in street politics, trying to attract support from 
disgruntled people. Another issue of theirs is promoting the 
term Maubere, the pejorative term for East Timorese living 
in the countryside from Portuguese colonial days. The other 
controversial issue is the party's support for 28 November 
1975 when the Democratic Republic of East Timor was 
proclaimed, as the country's independence day, whereas the 
general consensus is to use 30 August 1999, the day of the 
referendum. ASDT achieved good results in the elections, 
with 6 seats but it remains to be seen whether it can play a 
constructive role in building East Timorese nationhood. 
Some points in the ASDT programme: going back to the old 
Fretilin programme of priorities in the economy, education, 
health, employment, equality and the environment. It 
favours a presidential/parliamentary system and a directly 
elected president. 
Spectacular results for women . 
As a young nation East Timor has an excellent opporturuty 
to avoid mistakes made by other newly independent states. 
Self sustainable development, the environment, small-scale 
economic enterprises are some of the critically important 
issues. 
One issue that has been widely discussed is the position of 
women. In March, REDE, the East Timorese Women's 
Network tried unsuccessfully to push for a quota of 30 per 
cent for women on party lists. Although this proposal was 
rejected, the results were a boost for women. Twenty-four of 
the 88 seats are occupied by women which is not far from 
the 30 per cent advocated by REDE. This is far better than 
in other Asian or Pacific states and is comparable to level of 
women's representation in Scandinavian countries. The 
breakdown is as follows: Fretilin 17, PSD 3 and ASDT, PST 
and PNT each 1 seat. All the PD members are male. 
Election observations 
IFET, the International Federation for East Timor, a coali-
tion of East Timor solidarity groups from 22 countries, of 
which TAPOL is a member, organised an Observer Project 
for the elections. While being very positive about the 
process and the very high turnout, it drew attention to some 
serious drawbacks. 
IFET has concluded that the campaign and voting were 
largely free and fair, and that the results accurately reflect 
the preferences of the population on the limited issues and 
choices placed before them. Although the lack of discussion 
of constitutional issues was disappointing, the political 
parties behaved on the whole with decorum and mutual 
respect, and few if any voters were coerced or intimidated. 
This is a good sign for the future of elections in East Timor. 
IFET was disappointed with the capacity-building aspect. 
It drew attention to a wide differentiation in the competence 
of district electoral officers, all of whom were foreigners. 
Many had trouble communicating with their East Timorese 
staff, and the working relationship was often strained. East 
Timorese poll workers were frequently excluded from open-
ing and closing the polling booths, and given menial tasks. 
Much should have been done to provide better working 
conditions and training for local staff, many of whom 
worked more than 10 hours without a break or food on elec-
tion day. Their assignments should have been more flexible 
and more should have been employed to ensure that voters 
did not have to wait so long to cast their votes. 
Some voters were required to cast their votes in other 
districts, requiring them to walk long distances. Within 
towns there appeared to be little logic as to which polling 
booth people should use. Many, including people in hospi-
tal or prison, were stripped of their right to vote because 
continued on pl9 
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1965: What the US and Britain knew but never revealed 
The recent (inadvertent) release of more cables between the US embassy in Jakarta and Washington in 
late 1965 has supplied more pieces of the jigsaw puzzle mapping Washington's enthusiastic support for 
the Indonesian army's bloodthirsty crackdown against the Indonesian Communist Party when up to a 
million people were slaughtered. Also, a new book published in July shows how the British embassy 
helped to spread misinformation about what was happening in Jakarta. 
Both Washington and London were of the opinion years 
before these events that President Sukarno should be 
removed. The communist party was growing fast in a coun-
try of strategic and economic importance to both Britain 
and the US. Sukarno had gone too far in his advocacy of a 
policy of non-alignment and his friendly links with the 
Soviet Union and China. 
After the CIA's disastrous involvement in the regional 
rebellions of the late 1950s, Washington changed tack and 
now saw that its interests lay in building close ties with the 
Indonesian armed forces under its commander, General 
A.H. Nasution. In mid 1960, Nasution proved his worth by 
using special martial law powers to ban the communist 
party in three provinces, South Sumatra, South Sulawesi 
and South Kalimantan. (The bans were later rescinded on 
the president's orders.) 
Liquidating Sukarno 
While on a visit to Washington in September 1960 for talks 
with the State and Defence Departments, General Nasution 
was given an assurance of US support in the event of a 
showdown between him and Sukarno over the communist 
issue. Assistant Secretary of State Graham Parsons was 
given the authority to tell Nasution that 'we are aware of and 
heartened by recent actions which the Army has taken to 
curb Communist power .... If American help is wanted in the 
form of military and economic assistance, the United States 
in such circumstances does its best to be helpful and 
quickly . . .. We would like General Nasution to feel that the 
United States would wish to be helpful to Indonesia too in 
such circumstances.' (1) Five years later, the US had the 
chance to honour that pledge. 
Britain was also in on the act. A CIA memorandum of June 
1962 stated that President Kennedy and Prime Minister 
Harold Macmillan had agreed at a meeting in April that 
year that it was desirable to 'liquidate' Sukarno, 'depending 
on the situation and available circumstances'. (2) Britain's 
hostility towards Sukarno went back many years and inten-
sified after he launched his konfrontasi policy against the 
establishment of Malaysia in 1963. There were even British 
and Australian plans to spread the war being waged along 
the border between Indonesia's Kalimantan and the north-
ern territories of Borneo to other parts oflndonesia. (3) The 
animosity towards Sukarno continued after Labour took 
over from the Tories in 1964. 
Supporting the massacre 
The action taken by a group of army officers in Jakarta on 
1 October 1965, when six generals were kidnapped and 
killed ostensibly in a move to pre-empt a coup against 
Sukarno, led within hours to a counter-attack and to a 
counter-coup by General Suharto. A massacre of unprece-
dented proportions against the PKI and its millions of 
supporters was soon underway and Suharto slowly but 
surely undermined and eventually ousted Sukarno, 
installing himself as president. 
On 5 October 1965, in what was probably his first 
comment on the events of 1 October, the British ambas-
sador, Andrew Gilchrist said in a letter to the Foreign 
Office: 'I have never concealed from you my belief that a 
little shooting in Indonesia would be an essential prelimi-
nary to effective change in Indonesia, but it makes me sad 
to think that they have begun with the wrong people.' (4) 
Soon his hopes for 'a littler shooting' against the 'right' 
people were to be fulfilled, beyond his wildest dreams. 
Within days of the murders on 1 October, both the British 
and US ambassadors were directing their attention to black-
ening the PKI and destroying the credibility of Sukarno. On 
6 October, without waiting for any evidence of the PKI's 
involvement in the murder of the generals, the British 
embassy in Jakarta advised British intelligence headquar-
ters in Singapore about the line to be taken regarding events 
in Jakarta:' ... we certainly do not exclude any unattributable 
propaganda or psywar activities which would contribute to 
weakening the PKI permanently. Suitable propaganda 
themes might be: PKI brutality in murdering Generals and 
Nasution's daughter. . . PKI subverting Indonesia as agents 
of foreign Communists... But treatment will need to be 
subtle, e.g (a) all activities should be strictly unattributable, 
(b) British participation or co-operation should be carefully 
concealed ... ( d) material should preferably appear to origi-
nate from Pakistan or Philippines.' (5) 
Although Britain and Indonesia were still in a state of war, 
it was in Britain's interests to ensure that the Indonesian 
army should now concentrate its forces on destroying the 
PKI. A cable from the Political Adviser (POLAD) to the 
Commander-in-Chief Far East in Singapore to the Foreign 
Office in London on 8 October referred to a suggestion of 
Ambassador Gilchrist in Jakarta 'that we should get word to 
the generals that we will not attack them whilst they are 
chasing the PKI. The C-in-C thinks this has some merit and 
might ensure that the Army is not detracted from what we 
consider to be a necessary task.' 
On 5 October, the US ambassador, Marshall Green, said in 
a cable to Washington that events in Jakarta 'may embolden 
army at long last to act effectively against Communists' . 
Weighing up what the US could do to 'shape developments 
to our advantage', Green set out a number of guidelines, 
Point B of which was: 'Covertly indicate clearly to key 
people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to 
be of assistance where we can', while Point E was: 'Spread 
the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this priority 
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effort is perhaps the most needed immediate assistance we led to the opening in Singapore two weeks later of an office 
can give army if we can find way to do it without identify- of the Foreign Office's Information Research Department 
ing it solely or largely as US effort.' (6) (IRD). It was headed by Norman Reddaway, one ?f. the 
On 20 October 1965, Ambassador Green reported to Foreign Office's most experienced propaganda specialists, 
Washington that 'the (communist) party has received... and chosen by Gilchrist as the best man for the job. 
blow to its image ... and some damage to its organisational Reddaway's prime target was the BBC's Southeast Asia 
strength through arrest, harassment and, in some cases, correspondent, Roland Challis whose book, published 
execution of PKI cadres .. . Some thousands of PKI cadres earlier this year exposes the methods used by Reddaway and 
have reportedly been arrested !Gilchrist to spread 
in Djakarta area alone and black propaganda 
several hundred of them have about what was 
been executed.' While admit- happening m 
ting that the PKI organisation Indonesia. (10) 
may still be largely intact, The brief of IRD 
Green concluded by saying: (set up in 1948 and 
'Army has nevertheless been disbanded in 1977) 
working hard at destroying was to 'collect infor-
PKI and I, for one, have mation about 
increasing respect for its deter- communist policy, 
ruination and organisation in tactics and propa-
carrying out this crucial ganda and to promote 
assignment.' (7) anti - c om mun i st 
A memorandum on the policy via missions 
Indonesian army circulated and information 
within the State Department services abroad'. But 
early in November said the IRD in Singapore had 
army's relations with the an extra brief, 
Pentagon ere based on associa- explained in a note 
tions developed during train- from Reddaway to 
ing in the US and were Challis: ' do 
'founded on trust, respect and a anything you can 
network of deep personal think of to get rid of 
friendships'. Gong on to Sukarno'. IRD's 
consider how the US govern- strategy was three-
ment might support the army,---------------------------fold, to target the 
it said: 'In the life and death strug- massacre in Central Java, 1965 PKI, to tar Sukarno with the communist brush and to 
gle which has finally been joined provide documentary support for Suharto's interpreta-
with the PKI, the Army deserves our support. (8) tion of the events of 1 October 1965. Foreign journalists 
The chances of providing that support were soon to present relied almost exclusively on information from this single 
themselves. A senior intelligence officer, Sukendro got in source, since they were not able till mid 1966 to visit 
touch with the US embassy in Bangkok in late October to Indonesia though, as Challis writes, 'MI6 agents came and 
ask Washington for assistance. This included 'small arms to went at will'. 
arm Moslem and nationalist youths in Central Java for use Reddaway's main source of information was top secret 
against the PKI'. According to the Bangkok embassy, telegrams, about four a week, by diplomat pouch from 
'Sukendro was obviously pleased with the favourable Gilchrist in Jakarta. Besides this of course, information was 
response to his request on behalf of the Indonesian Army flowing into the IRD office from other sources, through 
leadership.' Covert arrangements would take the form of the intercepts, and from US and Australian intelligence sources 
'Army's ostensible purchase of medicines and a review of all of whom knew exactly what was going on but, writes 
the medical list by Sukendro's doctor'. (9) Nothing is yet Challis, 'control of information was rigorous. No word of 
known about quantity of arms supplied as 'medicines' but the slaughter came my way.' Other British media on the 
they had been requested to arm non-military killers and receiving end of the IRD's doctored reports were The Times, 
make the anti-PKI slaughter appear to be a 'popular' reac- Daily Telegraph, Observer and the Daily Mail. A quick 
tion to the events of 1 October. perusal of the distortions that appeared in the British press, 
A cable from Marshall Green the previous day said: 'In 'civil war,' 'armed communist gangs', and so on, as the 
Central Java army (RPKAD) is training Moslem youth and massacres progressed show how successful this black 
supplying them with weapons and will keep them out in propaganda was. No wonder there was not a murmur of 
front against the PKI. Army will try to avoid as much as it protest in the UK to stay the hand of Suharto's killers. 
can safely do so direct confrontation with PKI.' He added: When Reddaway was asked by Gilchrist many years later 
'Smaller fry are being systematically arrested and jailed or to summarise some of the stories re-cycled from the 
executed.' embassy through the IRD, his list included the following: 
Britain's black propaganda campaign 
The points made in the British embassy's note of 6 October 
'Various sitreps from yourself which were put almost 
instantly back to Indonesia via the BBC. You may remem-
ber complaining that the versions put back were uncomfort-
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What the embassy really knew 
Documents released by the Public Records Office in the 
mid-1990s, in accordance with the 30-year rule, include 
many cables from the embassy to the Foreign Office in 
London which show how closely British diplomats were 
following the slaughter. And they were liaising closely with 
the Americans and the Australians in a joint effort to 'try to 
keep a score'. 
In a cable dated 13 January 1966, James Murray, British 
Charge d'Affaires wrote: 'It is a matter for constant specula-
tion here how many Indonesians have been killed . . . since 
30 September .. .. The Americans, with their considerable 
intelligence resource, try to keep a score and I understood 
their latest estimate was about 150,000. A report that the 
Australians have from a police source puts the deaths in 
Bali alone at 28,000.' 
On 23 February 1966, Gilchrist wrote a three-page report 
containing the findings of the Swedish ambassador who had 
been able to make a tour of Central and East Java in the 
company of a Swedish engineer who was inspecting tele-
phone exchanges installed by Ericsson. Travelling with his 
Indonesian wife, the ambassador was able to speak to lower-
ranking officials out of earshot of government officials. 
Here are extracts from his letter: 
'The Ambassador and I had discussed the killings before he 
left and he had found my suggested figure of 400,000 quite 
incredible. His enquiries have led him to consider it a very 
serious under-estimate.' 
'A bank manager in Surabaya with 20 employees said that 
four had been removed one night and (to his certain knowl-
edge) beheaded. A British expert employed in setting up a 
spinning factory near Surabaya said that about a third of the 
factory technicians, being members of a Communist union, 
had been killed. . . . The killings in Bali, according to what 
the Ambassador could pick up, had been particularly 
monstrous. In certain areas, it was felt that not enough 
people (emphasis in the original) had been killed.' 
The man who had spoken of the need for 'a little shooting' 
four months earlier now appeared to be horrified himself at 
what was happening. Needless to say, none of this was 
allowed to leak out to the public. 
It was clearly with Western connivance that the true horror 
of the killings unleashed as Suharto took control of 
Indonesia were kept secret. No wonder that even today, few 
commentators or journalists have any notion of Suharto 
being a genocidal killer and his name is never mentioned 
when people call for the world's worst criminals against 
humanity to be called to account. 
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Arsenio Bano joins new East Timor 
government 
Arsenio Bano, a close friend and associate of TAPOL for 
many years, has been appointed as Minister for Labour and 
Solidarity in East Timor's Second Transitional 
Government. 
Arsenio, who was one of the 29 East Timorese who occu-
pied the US embassy during the 1995 APEC conference in 
Jakarta, came to London from Portugal shortly after and 
joined our staff as documentalist and analyst of East Timor 
and Indonesia. We always treasured his insight into the 
developing situation in East Timor. He left London in 
October 1999 to return to East Timor, keen to be there as 
soon as possible after the outstanding ballot results and the 
appalling destruction inflicted on his people by the 
Indonesian army and their militia proxies. 
He became active in building civil society and was 
appointed director of the NGO Forum in 2000. He also 
devoted much of his attention and energies to the situation 
in Oecussie, which is where he was born and grew up. 
TAPOL warmly welcomes his appointment to a post that 
will give· him many opportunities to protect East Timorese 
workers and help forge ties with solidarity movements 
around the world. • 
continued from pl 6 ... 
there was no absentee voting procedure and because voters 
had to used a designated centre (see report from the Judicial 
System Monitoring Programme). 
Another concern relates to the lack of voter education 
before the vote. Based on numerous interviews with people 
after they voted, IFET observers found that many voters, 
particularly elderly voters and women, did not know that 
they were voting for a Constituent Assembly or what the 
Assembly was for. 
Sources for this article 
IFET, Preliminary Report: Elections in the Context of 
Nation-Building, 3 September 2001 , Dili, East Timor 
Watch Indonesia, Interview with Fernando de Araujo, 4 
September 2001 , Berlin, Germany 
Helen Hill, Tales of the Reconstruction, Arena Magazine 54, 
August-September 2001, Melbourne, Australia 
Timor Link No.53 , August 2001 , London, UK 
AP 10 September, The Age 10 September, LUSA 6 
September. • 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 163, October 2001 19 
BOOK REVIEW 
Angel Rabasa, Peter Chalk, Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia, Rand Publica-
tion, 2001 , 115 pp, ISBN 0-8330-3006-XMR-134-AF 
The territorial integrity of Indonesia, the world's largest 
archipelago and fourth most populous state, is of concern to 
many governments, military establishments, academics and 
think-tanks, particularly in the US. The fear that Indo-
nesia's political transformation might tum into a nightmare, 
an 'Asian Yugoslavia', as the authors put it, is the main 
reason why this book was written. Indonesia's geopolitical 
weight making it the bedrock of Southeast Asia, is another 
expression used by the authors. As explained in the pref-
ace, this book was the result of a research project in the 
Strategy and Doctrine Programme of Project AIR FORCE, 
sponsored by the US Air Force. 
The authors have a track record of writing about the 
Southeast Asia region and Peter Chalk is also very knowl-
edgeable on the topical issue of terrorism. The publication 
is subdivided into ten chapters, with a concluding chapter 
on 'Implications for the US and the US Air Force'. All the 
main problems in Indonesia are covered and in common 
with most think-tank publications, there is a chapter on 
possible scenarios about Indonesia's political future. 
The book gives a good overview of the present prob-lems 
Indonesia is facing, and tries hard to be up-to-date. 
However, this also creates problems; as with many other 
recent publications on Indonesia, they quickly get out of 
date, with developments occurring at breakneck speed. 
Megawati is the third president since the fall of Suharto in 
May 1998. This publication was finalised during the Wahid 
administration and since then some political parameters 
have shifted considerably. 
It's probably not fair to accuse the authors of superfici-
ality. No one can be expected to analyse such a complex 
place as Indonesia in a hundred pages. For almost three 
decades, the Suharto years, Indonesian politics had little to 
commend itself for thoughtful analysis. Political life was 
basically non-existent and analysing Indonesia became very 
boring. This has now changed markedly. The fall of Suharto 
has opened new avenues for democracy but also opened a 
Pandora's box. The book deals with all these problems but 
often only touching the surface or with snap-shot observa-
tions of the many trouble spots. Since the book was written, 
the problems in Aceh and Papua have wors-ened dramati-
cally while Maluku has moved into new, more peaceful 
phase. 
One analytical framework is properly highlighted, the 
burning issue whether the fall of Suharto has also meant the 
unravelling of the institutions that underpinned his regime. 
The authors believe that this has happened while other 
analysts insist that the power of some institutions have in 
fact increased. The new Megawati administration in many 
ways reflects the restoration and consolidation of the two 
major institutions: the military and the bureaucracy. (See 
separate article in this issue.) The difference is, as we have 
seen in many Eastern European governments, they simply 
change their ideological caps and continue to rule. 
The section on East Timor fails to mention the crucial point 
that East Timor was militarily invaded by Indonesian troops 
in December 1975 and therefore the Jakarta admini-stration 
lacked the legitimacy of the international commu-nity. In 
contrast, it is correctly mentioned in the (West) Papua 
section that the region was not part of the original republic. 
It is a pity that both the vibrant Papuan and Aceh civil soci-
eties and their many shades of NGOs and political organi-
sations receive no attention. It focuses only on GAM and 
OPM, the two liberation organisations. A proper politi-cal 
solution for the two trouble spots cannot be achieved with-
out the involvement of civil society. 
But it is the recommendations at the end of the book 
intended for the US Air Force and specifically the Pacific 
Air Forces Command that merit most attention. The first 
recommendation is to support Indonesia's stability and ter-
ritorial integrity, a cliche used by every foreign diplomat. 
The second recommendation is more controversial as it 
recommends re-engagement with the Indonesian military. 
So far, US Congress has halted engagement with TNI until 
substantial improvements have been made. Military opera-
tions n Aceh show that the TNI hasn't changed in practice; 
it is still violating human rights on a grand scale and impu-
nity is still the name of the game in post-Suharto Indonesia. 
The authors regret the ending of IMET training for In-
donesian officers, arguing that the lack of exposure to 'US 
values' through this training may well be 'a contributing 
factor to the rising tide of anti-American sentiment among 
senior and mid-level Indonesian military officers today' 
(page 101 ). This ignores the fact that several generations of 
top Indonesian officers since the fifties , trained by IMET, 
were precisely the ones who committed all the heinous 
crimes against humanity in the past 35 years. 
The authors justifiably put strong focus on the strength-
ening of the defence capacities of the Indonesian air force 
and navy - as they were by and large not involved in inter-
nal security operations and therefore not involved in the 
human rights abuses . 
The third and fourth recommendations relate to helping 
rebuild a constructive Indonesian role in regional security 
plus the development of a regional crisis reaction force 
which fits in with the present (at least until the terrorist at-
tacks on 11 September) isolationist position of the Bush 
government. On one hand, this means that the US is happy 
to maintain the position as the sole · superpower on this 
planet while being unwilling to become the global cop. In 
the same way as it sees the role of Europe as a military 
force, the US wants to see the emergence of an ASEAN 
military force to deal with the regional problems. 
Liem Soei Liang 
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Special autonomy for Papua provokes controversy 
While Indonesian security forces, in particular the notorious Brimob, continue to commit atrocities in 
West Papua, efforts are being made to win over the population by enacting an autonomy bill that 
contains a number of concessions on matters regarding the status of the territory. Meanwhile, a new 
initiative on exposing the illegality of the territory's integration into Indonesia has been taken. 
Following the hugely successful congress in June 2000 
which gave birth to the Papuan Presidium Council and 
adopted a resolution supporting independence, there have 
been sustained efforts to counteract the pro-independence 
movement by offering West Papua a very special kind of 
autonomy. The results of the congress, held while 
Abdurrahman Wahid was president and with his implicit 
endorsement, came as a shock to Jakarta because of the 
clear evidence of widespread alienation in West Papuans 
from Indonesian rule. Once Suharto had been forced out of 
office in May 1998, West Papuans made good use of the 
greater freedom by giving expression to their pro-indepen-
dence views by flying the West Papuan flag. 
But efforts to produce a special autonomy bill acceptable 
to all sides have run into problems. A bill drafted by a team 
from the university and several Papuan public figures grants 
the population the right to fly their own flag and have their 
own anthem, and opens the way for an independent investi-
gation into the process, the so-called 'Act of Free Choice', 
by which the territory was integrated into the Indonesian 
Republic in late 1969. It would also give the local people a 
substantial share (80 per cent) in the proceeds from the 
exploitation of West Papua's abundant natural resources. 
Enticing as this might sound, a group of Indonesian legis-
lators who visited Wamena in the central highlands in 
August to consult the local people about the draft were told 
in no uncertain terms that the people refuse autonomy. 'We 
want independence', yelled hundreds of villagers as they 
chased the parliamentarians back to their hotel. 
The Presidium chairperson, Theys Elauy, who is currently 
facing charges of subversion in a court in Jayapusa, said: 
'We are not Indonesian. Our culture, our hair, our skin are so 
different.' According to West Papua's leading human rights 
activist, John Rumbiak, 'The people here no longer believe 
in any kind of political offer. They believe that indepen-
dence is the only solution.' A Cathlic priest, Theo van den 
Broek, who heads the justice commission of the Diocese of 
Jayapura, said: 'If this is watered down and forced on the 
community ... , there will be a lot more protests .. ., more 
violent action'. 
But the military commander of the Trikora regional 
command, Major-General Mahadin Simbolon, said: 'We 
cannot tolerate any other flag to be raised than our red-and-
white.' He even accused local human rights groups of 
'purposely exaggerating the security crackdown, or even 
inventing incidents, so that the international community 
will always pay attention to Papua.' Simbolon previously 
served as the military commander in East Timor and is no 
stranger to confronting a population pressing for recogni-
tion of its right to self-determination. [Asia Wall Street 
Journal, 21August2001] 
This draft is also having a rough ride in the Indonesian 
parliament, where most fractions see it as likely to under-
mine West Papua's status as part of the unitary state of 
Indonesia. There are moves in parliament to draft an alter-
native bill which is even less likely to receive approval by 
Papuans. 
One of Indonesia's leading academics, the sociologist Se lo 
Sumardjan, said that the main issue in Papua was not 
special autonomy but injustice, repression and discrimina-
tion. He berated the central government's discriminative 
treatment of Papuans, 'the human rights abuses and the wide 
disparity between indigenous locals and migrant people'. 
He said the central government has for decades 'looted' 
resources and given nothing in return to local people who 
have been abandoned to their prolonged backwardness. 
[Jakarta Post, 31 July, 2001] 
Legal challenge to integration 
Meanwhile, Professor Sam Blay, a law professor at the 
University of Technology, Sydney, who is an expert on self-
determination, has agreed to head a team of lawyers from 
around the world to prepare a case to overturn the legal 
basis of Indonesian rule. The aim is to persuade members of 
the United Nations to re-examine the issue by seeking an 
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice in 
The Hague. Another idea is to seek a declaration by a Dutch 
court that the Dutch government's conduct in the period 
before the fraudulent Act of Free Choice amounted to a 
dereliction of duty. That Act, conducted in 1969 under 
heavy pressure from the Indonesian armed forces and 
Suharto's intelligence assistant, Ali Murtopo, consisted of a 
unanimous decision by 1,025 hand-picked tribal chiefs to 
accept the territory's integration into Indonesia. The deci-
sion was 'taken note of' in a resolution of the UN General 
Assembly in November 1969. 
Ghanian-born Professor Blay, who has been engaged by 
the Papuan Presidium Council to head the inquiry, said: 
'Without the law, the West Papuans have no basis to argue 
the case.' 
In Jayapura, the deputy chairman of the Presidium Council 
Tom Beanal, addressing the Papuan Women's Conference 
attended by 500 delegates, reiterated the Council's commit-
ment to the struggle to be free. Speaking the day after 
Abdurrahman Wahid had been ousted as president, Beanal 
said: 'Whoever leads Indonesia, we will continue the strug-
gle to be free.' He also said the Council remained commit-
ted to peaceful dialogue, not violence. [Jakarta Post, 25 July 
2001] 
Papuans kept out of Pacific Islands Forum 
The Presidium suffered a setback however in its bid to 
maintain contact with the Pacific Islands Forum. At the 
Forum's meeting in Kiribati in 2000, representatives of the 
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Papuan Presidium Counci l were invited to attend as 
observers and were instrumental in persuading the meeting 
to adopt a position regarding West Papua, condemning the 
continuing violence there. 
This year's meeting, held in Nauru in the middle of August, 
went ahead without any West Papuans. For the first time, the 
Indonesian government was invited to send an observer. The 
Forum's decision came as a shock to Jakarta which felt that 
it had been outmanoeuvred by the Presidium and must have 
lobbied hard for an invitation to this year's meeting. 
Days before the annual meeting was due to start, the Nauru 
government made it known that West Papuans would not be 
welcome. The Presidium's international representative, 
Franzalbert Joku, who has campaigned strenuously to gain 
international recognition of West Papua's plight in the past 
year, told Dateline, a programme of Australia's SBS televi-
sion channel, that the setback was not unexpected. He said 
that once the Forum had agreed to invite Indonesia as a 
dialogue partner, Jakarta started pressing the other partici-
pating nations to oppose West Papuan participation. 
He accused the Australian government of being instru-
mental in putting pressure on Nauru to keep the Presidium 
out. After the 2000 meeting, Australia was heavily criticised 
by Jakarta for the position taken then by the Forum. [SES 
Dateline, 15 August 2001] 
In 2000, Nauru was one of two South Pacific countries to 
speak in favour of self-determination for West Papua at the 
UN General Assembly. The other country was Vanuatu. 
Even without West Papuans being present however, the 
Forum included a paragraph in its final statement about the 
situation in West Papua, which reads as follows: 
'Forum Leaders expressed continuing concern about 
violence and loss of life in the Indonesian province of Irian 
Jaya (West Papua) . They encouraged the Indonesian 
Government, the sovereign authority, to ensure that the 
voices of all parties in the province are heard in order to 
achieve a peaceful resolution of their differences . Forum 
Leaders welcomed the recent presentation of special auton-
omy proposals to Indonesia's Parliament. They also urged 
all parties to protect and uphold the human rights of all resi-
dents in Irian Jaya (West Papua). Forum Leaders agreed to 
follow closely developments in the province.' 
Mamberamo project threatens 35 tribes 
Plans to dam the waters of the magnificent Mamberamo 
river, first thought up while Suharto was still in power, 
appear to be proceeding, after several years of delay, caused 
by Indonesia's economic crisis. According to a scientist, 
Eben Kirksey, who coordinated a World Wildlife Fund 
expedition to the region to study the area's biodiversity 
earlier this year, the river drains an area larger than England 
that is home to 35 nomadic tribes. Damming the river, he 
argues, could flood up to half the territory of West Papua. 
On 2 April this year, the governor of Irian Jaya (West 
Papua) J.P Salossa, announced that the $6 billion 
Mamberamo megaproject was proceeding 'with renewed 
momentum', thanks to funding from the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank. 
The dam would provide energy to fuel an immense indus-
trial estate including metal smelting works, sawmills, 
agribusiness plantations and petro-chemical processing 
factories . 
The WWF expedition travelled upstream to Iau where the 
village chief told the team: 'I would rather be shot in the 
head than resettled.' [The Guardian, 1August2001] • 
continued from p23 
and was the subject of an urgent action entitled 'Fear of 
torture' by Amnesty International. 
Brimob also shot dead a peasant woman, Ester Matipoi, 
28, from Yopanggar, after accusing her of giving food to 
the family of the teacher, Daniel Yairus Ramar. A boy, aged 
11 , Michael Numayom was also shot dead in the same 
village. 
Economic activity halted 
Dozens of homes have been torched during sweeps and 
tight controls have been imposed on the daily activities of 
--~ the inhabitants . 
Implements that they 
use in their daily work, 
such as fishing tackle 
and axes, have been 
destroyed, leading to 
food shortages. 
Villagers now need 
travel passes if they 
want to go anywhere, 
and anyone who is 
unable to produce an 
identity card is held 
and beaten. Local 
markets have virtually 
come to a standstill 
since the operation 
began. Even so they 
are required to supply 
food several times a 
week for Brimob 
troops. 
Confronted by calls 
· for the operation to be 
halted, the the security forces have said that the operation 
will not end until the seven weapons that were seized when 
five members of Brimob were killed on 13 June have been 
recovered. 
Local church leaders and human rights defenders have 
called for the withdrawal ofBrimob from Wasior, for a halt 
to the atrocities perpetrated against the civilian population, 
for people to be compensated for the loss of homes and 
personal belongings, and for all those responsible for the 
atrocities to be called to account in a court of law. 
Source: 'Crimes Against Humanity' The truth about the 
Sweep and Crush Operation in Wasior, district of 
Manokwari. A preliminary report by ELS-HAM, 22 
August 2001. • 
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Brimob's 'Sweep-and-Crush Operation' 
During the past few months, West Papuans have been subjected to an increasingly brutal series of 
abuses, particularly in the region of Wasior. There have been killings, disappearances and torture 
inflicted on civilians who have fallen victim to a special operation mounted by Brimob, the special 
forces of the Indonesian police. 
The code name of the operation, 'Sweep and Crush', means 
that this is intended to be a military operation against the 
armed resistance movement, the OPM, but the entire opera-
tion has been directed against villagers living in or near the 
sub-district of Wasior, in the district of Manokwari, For 
several months now, the region that has been sealed off to 
prevent church leaders and human rights activists from 
entering. 
Brimob, the police force Mobile Brigade, is invariably the 
force identified as the ones responsible for the frequent 
abuses. Although the police force was separated from the 
armed forces near three years ago, in a move to civilianise 
the force, Brimob has earned itself a reputation, particularly 
in West Papua and Aceh, of being the most brutal security 
force in the country. 
Local dispute has fatal consequences 
According to a report released in August by ELS-HAM, 
the leading human rights NGO in Jayapura, the operation 
has resulted in ten summary executions, a number of disap-
pearances and the burning of many homes. 
Villagers in Wondama had been in dispute for years with a 
local logging firm over the amount of compensation for 
trees felled in their forest land. On 31 March this year, at a 
point when the dispute was reaching a climax, three 
employees of the company were shot dead during an attack 
by an unidentified armed gang. The murders led to the 
arrival in the region of Brimob units to hunt down the OPM, 
thought to be responsible for the attack. In an atmosphere of 
fear, many villagers fled their homes. Additional Brimob 
forces were detailed to guard all the logging companies in 
the area. On 3 May, Brimob seized a 22 men on their way 
home from Wasior to Puncak Jaya district, after attending a 
traditional ceremony. Six of the men were shot dead, two 
were seriously wounded and the others were arrested. 
On 13 June, two and a half months after the first logging 
company was attacked, an armed gang attacked another 
logging company, CV Vatika Papuana Perkasa (VPP), in the 
village of Wondiboi, killing five members of Brimob who 
were on guard, and a civilian employee and seizing several 
guns and ammunition. Following this attack, the police 
force/Brimob, with the backing of the regional military 
command, launched Operasi Penyisiran dan Penumpasan 
(Sweep and Crush Operation) and sealed offWasior. Many 
more Brimob troops were flown to the area; they appear to 
be the ones primarily responsible for the sweeps against the 
local population in their search for the OPM. 
The Brimob sweeps were extended to the district of 
Ransiki where nine people were arrested and tortured, 
including a 15-year old schoolboy, Sefnat Kawey, who was 
beaten so badly he fell unconscious. He was later dragged 
along an asphalt road to Brimob headquarters. 
Husband murdered, wife harassed 
Among the many dozens of people taken into custody, was 
a 51-year-old primary school teacher, Daniel Yairus Ramar 
who died in police custody in Manokwari, two hours after 
he had been interrogated for the umpteenth time. The police 
later alleged that he had died 'of natural causes' . Daniel 
Yairus Ramar, was the head of the Council of the Tribal 
Wondama Community and had been severely tortured 
because he denied that he took part in the armed attacks in 
Wasior Sub-district, Manokwari District earlier in the year. 
When relatives went to the hospital where his body had 
been taken, the police said the body could only be released 
for burial if they undertook not to press for accountability 
for the death. But relatives later said that they would not be 
intimidated into keeping silent. 
The victim had been arrested in South Yapen, along with 
his wife, Amelia, and their five daughters and taken from 
there to Manokwari. 
After his death, his wife, Amelia Woisiri, was subjected to 
heavy pressure by the security forces to confess that her 
husband had been involved in the armed attacks on two 
logging companies and to locate a gun he was alleged to 
own. She vehemently denied their allegations but was taken 
against her wishes to Nabire and warned that Brimob would 
Tornado Bokway, 27, was severely beaten by eight members 
of Brimob and suffered swellings and bruises to his face and 
hand. This followed an incident when he was kicked without 
provocation by a drunken Brimob member, while watching a 
football match with two friends , and tried to fight back. The 
Brimob member and seven others later followed him in a 
truck and beat him up. He was later interrogated at the 
Manokwari police station and ordered to reveal the where-
abouts of his two friends. This is typical of the unprovoked 
brutality used against Papuans by officers who seem to 
regard every Papuan as a potential threat. 
be called in to interrogate her if she did not comply with 
what the police wanted her to do. She was also told that if 
she did not cooperate, she would end up dead like her 
husband. She was taken into police custody on 15 August 
continued on p22 
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GLOBAL CRISIS 
Indonesia and the current world crisis 
On 19 September, President Megawati Sukamoputri went 
to Washington to meet President Bush for a state visit that 
had been agreed before the horrendous events in New York 
and Washington on 11 September when more than six thou-
sand people of many nations met their deaths as the result 
of a heinous, terrorist attack. TAPOL joins in mourning 
those who were killed, while continuing to mourn the one 
million or more Indonesians who met their deaths as 
Suharto took power in 1965/1966. On that occasion, 
Washington gave unstinting support to Suharto and the 
Indonesian army to continue with this massacre and made 
no calls on the world community to fight terrorism - state 
terrorism - which might well have halted the massacre in its 
tracks. 
By deciding to go ahead with the meeting with the 
Indonesian president at a time when he is building an inter-
national coalition for his 'war against terrorism', Bush 
evidently expected Indonesia, with the world's largest 
Muslim population, to stand 'shoulder-to-shoulder' with 
Washington as it whips up international support for his 
warmongering project. In the event, Megawati went no 
farther than to pledge 'to cooperate with the international 
community in combating terrorism'. 
Megawati's measured response shows that she knows full 
well that support for Washington in Indonesia is less than 
enthusiastic. Many Indonesians will not forget that during 
the three decades of the Suharto dictatorship, all adminis-
trations in Washington kept silent about the massive, ongo-
ing repression and grotesque human rights abuses and did 
nothing to halt arms supplies until undeniable facts emerged 
about the death and destruction in East Tim or in 1999. 
Megawati also knows that she could face a serious backlash 
from Indonesian Muslims should she sign up for a war on 
countries with huge Muslim populations. 
Cooperation on counter terrorism 
The two presidents agreed to 'strengthen bilateral cooper-
ation on counter-terrorism'. Indonesia has been plagued for 
more than a year by many bombings which have killed and 
maimed hundreds and destroyed property. The Indonesian 
police have shown themselves to be virtually incapable of 
tracking down and bringing to justice the perpetrators of 
these terrible crimes. She would have done better to pledge 
reform of the police and improve their ability to fight crime. 
Undoubtedly many of those responsible for these crimes 
have links with groups in other countries, but reports 
currently circulating in Indonesia that Osama bin Laden 
may be behind the spate of bombings stretches credulity. 
Still worse, they may be part of a strategy to enhance the 
role of Lt.General Hendropriyono who Megawati appointed 
to head the new State Intelligence Agency (see page 7). No 
doubt, some of the $5billion now allocated to Bush's 'war on 
terrorism' will find its way into this Agency's coffers and 
Megawati's intelligence supremo will enjoy the new promi-
nence bestowed on his network of spies and 'intel' opera-
tives. 
It should not be forgotten that the army connived in inflam-
ing the religious strife that has held Maluku in its grip since 
early 1999. Laskar Jihad gangs were not prevented from 
going to Maluku and funds from top army commands were 
used to support these gangs. The credentials of the 
Indonesian armed forces in fighting these self-confessed 
Muslim extremists is less than salubrious. 
Accountability for human rights abuses 
Megawati made a pledge, in her statement with Bush, 'to 
resolve outstanding issues relating to past human rights 
violations, especially in conflict zones'. She asserted that 'as 
a state based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
freedom of religion, Indonesia recognises the importance of 
accountability for human rights abuses'. 
TAPOL warmly welcomes this pledge. However, we know 
that, if she stands by this pledge, she will find herself on a 
collision course with numerous military officers, retired or 
still on active service, who must be held accountable for 
crimes against humanity in East Timor, in Aceh, in West 
Papua and in Indonesia during the Suharto regime of terror. 
The man she chose as Attorney General, A.M. Rahman, has 
a deplorable reputation for the job he now holds; he has 
continued on p6 
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